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Abstract
There has been substantial interest in inequality and the distribution of wealth for cen-
turies. After changes beginning in the 1980’s, rising income and wealth inequality at the
top has become an important item on the policy agenda and in public discussion. This
thesis develops the study of wealth inequality in two key directions - firstly, the study and
use of mobility in wealth amongst households to understand and discriminate between
the mechanisms and theories purporting to explain the highly concentrated distribution
of wealth in the upper tail. Secondly, the study of interactions between entrepreneurship,
which is prominent amongst the wealthy, and aggregate shocks to the economy.
In Chapter One, I investigate wealth data in the UK find that there is substantial
mobility amongst the wealthy and large changes in wealth. In Chapter Two, I use these
findings to estimate a model incorporating multiple theories of the upper wealth distribu-
tion and identify that heterogeneity in returns has the best fit to the data.
In Chapter Three I turn to entrepreneurship, examining the impact of entrepreneurial
constraints on the economy when responding to aggregate shocks. I find evidence of in-
creased dispersion amongst businesses during recessions and use this to calibrate uncertainty-
and mobility- increasing ‘turbulence shocks amongst entrepreneurs. I find that entrepreneurial
behaviour amplifies TFP-style shocks and symmetric turbulence shocks have rich effects,
changing the distribution of wealth and delivering medium term decreased output and a
spell of longer term increased output through slow capital reallocation.
I conclude that the study of the top of the wealth distribution and entrepreneurship
has significant implications, in terms of understanding the mechanisms behind inequality
and the mechanisms that drive patterns in the business cycle.
IMPACT STATEMENT
This work impacts a large range of literatures within economics and in wider social
science. My investigation of mobility, inequality and entrepreneurship throws light on key
questions that are prominent in public discourse and policy discussions as well as academia.
How likely are those in the top 1% to be there in 2, 5 or 10 years and why? And how
likely are those not at the top to move up to it? Why do those at the top hold so much
wealth? Does entrepreneurship, inequality and individual shocks affect the economy over
the business cycle? My research answers these questions and provides a framework for
future research - for example, when considering government policies to increase welfare for
those across the distribution, it is important to understand mobility in that distribution,
and what effects changes on the individual level have on the economy, including small
businesses which in aggregate provide significant employment and output.
The research demonstrates the importance of considering mobility when explaining
the high inequality at the top of the wealth distribution, and shows the role that en-
trepreneurial capital constraints can have in amplifying and propagating different types of
aggregate shocks associated with recessions.This impacts upon policy making with regards
to fiscal policy concerning small businesses, prudential lending regulation and monetary
policy, all areas where the businesses cycle and the contributions of entrepreneurial be-
haviour to fluctuations is of great importance.
Outside of academia or policy making, there is a large and varied discussion regarding
inequality, inclusion and opportunity. By providing facts on mobility at the very top,
especially on the potentially short tenure of some of the very wealthy, this thesis informs
the debate. Interpreting and inferring from those facts is also important, and the work un-
derstanding the mechanisms driving these patterns in the data is significant. It shows that
claims of wealth inequality being sourced from different preferences for future saving or
from sudden ‘superstar’ earnings do not successfully match the data, whilst heterogeneity
in returns from wealth and investment does and is key to understanding the downwards
movements in the distribution.
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Chapter 1
The Wealth and Assets Survey
and Wealth Dynamics at the top
In this chapter, I investigate the UK Wealth and Assets Survey (Office for National Statis-
tics and UK Data Service [2018]). I benchmark inequality and the representation of the
wealthy in the survey versus Estate data, other surveys and available rich lists for the top
1000, showing the WAS represents inequality at the top at least as well as other sources.
I argue for the use and imputation of business wealth from the survey and study that
wealth.
There is a large concentration of wealth in the UK, with the top 1% holding approxi-
mately 20% of assets, with a threshold for entry of over £3 million. I document substantial
wealth mobility amongst the top, with one third of the top 1% leaving this category in 2
years and half of the top 1% leaving in six years. There is also evidence of greater mobility
amongst the very top during the 07-09 recession years.
1.1 Introduction
The very wealthiest hold a large fraction of wealth in most developed economies and
there has been substantial interest in documenting shares of wealth held by the very wealth-
iest - for example, the works of Piketty [2014] and Saez and Zucman [2014] studying the
long run sequences of these wealth shares and other features of the wealth distribution. I
use a wealth survey dataset for the UK, the Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS) published
by the Office for National Statistics and UK Data Service [2018], to contribute to this
literature, providing and analysing similar cross-sectional moments to the literature, val-
idating the data against other sources and then contributing new facts through studying
longitudinal transitions of the wealthy.
In the UK, Alvaredo et al. [2017] provide a cross-sectional analysis using Estate data,
one of four main sources for study of the (upper) wealth distribution - estate data, asset
income data, rich lists of the wealthy and wealth surveys. The UK does not yet have an
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available dataset for adequately recreating wealth from asset income, but has the Sunday
Times Rich List covering the wealthiest 1000 individuals or households and an array of
surveys. Amongst these, the WAS is unique due to a combination of size, oversampling of
the wealthy and depth of wealth, income and portfolio questions. Importantly, amongst
its international wealth survey peers, the WAS is rare for including longitudinal features.
The first contribution of this work is to demonstrate that the WAS has a better rep-
resentation of the top of the wealth distribution than previously thought, on a variety of
dimensions, especially in later waves. There has been criticism of the WAS in Crossley
et al. [2016] for poor representation of the top 1%. Yet, I show the wealthy in the WAS are
richer than in estate data and compare favourably to the rich list, particularly focusing
on the impact of business wealth and pensions.
The mobility of the wealthy is an important economic fact - a world with long, stable
dynasties may have very different implications to one with rapid rises and falls of different
households, something I study with structural macroeconomic models in other chapters.
These dynamics of the wealthy tail are less studied than the cross-section, largely due to
a relative lack of data. To my knowledge, there are few alternative longitudinal wealth
datasets to examine wealth dynamics at the top of the distribution. Thus, longitudinal
data from the WAS can shed light on this topic.
Thus the second contribution of this chapter is that I use the WAS to study the
relatively unknown distribution of changes in wealth faced by (top) households and their
wealth mobility patterns. There is substantial wealth and income mobility at the top. To
my knowledge, this study is the first to extensively analyse these distributions of panel
changes in wealth including the very wealthy. Over a third of the wealthiest 1% exit this
group biennially and are unlikely to return. After six years, only half of the wealthiest 1%
remain in the same wealth category.
Their dynamics show rich history dependence and indicate more than a simple Markov-
style process. Newer entrants to wealthy groups such as the top 1% are much more likely
to leave again in two years (60% exit) versus those already in the group (20% exit). There
are also high likelihoods of dramatic changes amongst the wealthy - for example, amongst
the wealthiest 5%, one quarter lose over 25% of their wealth and 10% lose over half their
wealth in two years. Quantile regression implies that serial dependencies over wealth
do not substantially weaken over longer time horizons, unlike the same dependencies for
German and American incomes seen in Trede [1998]. In addition, I find moments of the
change in log wealth distribution over quantiles of wealth to be similar to the U-shaped
skew and variance curves found in Guvenen et al. [2015] for earnings. To my knowledge,
this study is the first to extensively analyse these distributions of survey panel changes in
wealth including the very wealthy, and I find similar patterns in the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF), Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and English Longitudinal Study
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of Ageing (ELSA) though these sources are less suited to studying the top of the wealth
distribution..
1.2 Literature Review
There is a well-established economic literature documenting and studying the cross-
sectional distribution of income and wealth over time, notably Atkinson and Piketty [2014]
covering income inequality over the 20th century and the study of wealth inequality in
Piketty [2014]. This is accompanied by a literature evaluating data quality to establish
empirical facts, to which I contribute. Alvaredo et al. [2017] study UK wealth using estate
data, which is a useful comparator for the WAS. They provide data on the UK wealth
distribution drawn from over a century of Estate data in the UK. This data demonstrates
a substantial fall in inequality from the 1920’s until the 1980’s, with a rise in wealth
inequality thereafter, much like the U.S.A.
Vermeulen [2016] studies the effectiveness of wealth surveys in capturing the wealthy,
and is a valuable reference for evaluating the WAS results. He finds that many wealth
surveys without substantial oversampling fail to match the wealth distribution at the
top when comparing to the Power Law found in the very extreme tail of the Forbes list
billionaires.
The approach of Bricker et al. [2015] to reconcile the SCF with capitalised income data
in Saez and Zucman [2014] informs the attempt to compare survey and estate data in this
study. In the case of the SCF versus capitalised incomes, the data can be reconciled with
the use of the careful use of the correct definitions and aggregate wealth measures, which
aligns to my findings with respect to the WAS and Estate data.
Whilst detailed work has been completed on top income transitions, mobility and dis-
tributions - for example, in the US, Auten et al. [2013]; Kopczuk et al. [2007] and Guvenen
et al. [2014a] - there is a relative lack of equivalents for wealth dynamics. Substantial Eu-
ropean alternatives include longitudinal Nordic and Scandinavian administrative wealth
datasets, for example, Fagereng et al. [2016] and the panel subsample of the Italian Survey
of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) discussed by Jappelli and Pistaferri [2000] and
Jappelli [1999]. The work by Fagereng et al. [2016] is of particular note as they discuss
returns to wealth, which is very close to the focus on wealth transitions and fluctuations
later in this study. Their findings of a significant individual component to wealth returns
is important when considering the mechanisms driving the wealth distribution in this
dissertation.
In the U.S. there are only 2 small one-off transitional datasets from the SCF - a 1989
re-interview of the 1983 wave (Kennickell and Starr-McCluer [1997]) and the same for
2007 and 2009 (Bricker et al. [2011]). There are therefore only two data points for US
SCF wealth transitions, separated by 20 years. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics
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(PSID) is relatively much longer (1968-present) but does not represent the richest via
oversampling like the SCF or WAS, and so misses the wealthiest 1%. Quadrini [2000]
and Hurst et al. [1998]) both study wealth in the PSID, and a more recent discussion
with reference to wealth mobility can be found in Carroll et al. [2017b]. There are also
long-term inter-generational studies of income and wealth persistence, but these are a very
different concept of mobility to that embodied in the biennial movements I consider.
The UK has a number of survey datasets which also include wealth information. The
closest to the WAS is ELSA, the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (Banks et al. [2019].
ELSA has detailed information on wealth throughout its 7-wave1 history of biennial waves
from 2000 to the present, but focuses only on those over 50 at the time of the first wave.
Meanwhile the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is designed to cover the whole
population and runs annually, but does not oversample the wealthy and only includes
substantial wealth information for 3 special waves (every five years), as this is not a major
focus for the survey (of Essex. Institute for Social and Research. [2018]). Both ELSA
and BHPS are substantially smaller than the WAS. The Bank of England/NMG Survey,
discussed in Anderson et al. [2016] is another alternative, running yearly over a similar
period to the WAS and including some wealth variables. But, the wide use of banding
and top coding for these variables, together with small survey size and potential sample
selection issues, limits its effectiveness.
1The 8th wave is being released at the time of writing.
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1.3 Top Wealth shares in the UK
In this section I analyse the WAS data and appropriate wealth measures, particularly
discussing the wealth shares of the richest x%. I also compare the WAS to estate data,
explicitly considering the two components in the wealth share figures, the numerator of
in-group wealth and the denominator of total population wealth, to identify the source of
differences. By using the careful comparisons and investigation of the WAS, I argue the
WAS effectively represents the top of the distribution.
The WAS is a biennial panel survey dataset covering wealth, income and demographics
for UK households. It is large versus the U.S. SCF or average country in the EU Household
Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS)2, with 20,000 or more households in each wave,
and new samples added from wave 3 onwards to maintain its size. The WAS contains 4
biennial survey waves, beginning in July 2006 - June 2008 for wave 1. Wealthy households
are also oversampled to account for lower response rates, much like other wealth surveys
(such as the SCF).3
For each household, WAS interviewers ask respondents for information on wealth,
income and various demographic features. They catalogue valuations and amounts of
different assets, as well as recording surrounding information such as date of purchases
for properties or personal opinions towards leaving a bequest. Like other well-designed
surveys4, interviewers endeavour to probe answers and ask respondents to use financial
statements and records as aids in their answers. The data provider also performs some im-
putation for missing responses and I analyse the impact of additional multiple imputation
for non-answerers to business wealth questions
I consider various definitions and levels of wealth based on the main categories in
the WAS: private business values; financial assets (cash, shares, bonds, investment funds,
savings products, deposits minus debts [informal and formal] and credit cards); property
(value minus mortgage debt); pensions and physical wealth (vehicles, jewellery, collectibles,
household contents). In each case, I consider the net measure of wealth, i.e. including
relevant debts as negative wealth. Different longitudinal weighting schemes do not affect
the cross-sectional and longitudinal results, particularly the ones used in later chapters.5
The definition of wealth used by the ONS in the original release is the sum of financial
wealth; property wealth; pension wealth and physical wealth, i.e. excluding business
wealth. I discuss their exclusion of business wealth and propose that the better measure
is the sum of business wealth; property wealth; financial wealth; and physical wealth, i.e.
2As examples, the SCF contains 6,000 families whilst the HFCS has 80,000, but contains 20 EU countries
- averaging 4,000 per country.
3Although the WAS has a lower oversampling rate, at 2x-3x versus 6x for the SCF, it has a larger
sample (approximately, WASn=20-30,000 households versus SCFn < 5000.), so still maintains a sizeable
responding sample for the top quantiles - around 500 observations for the top 1% and 1500 for the top 5%.
4The benchmark examples being the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances and Panel Survey of Income
Dynamics as two of the most frequent sources for wealth data in economic research.
5See Appendix (A.0.5)
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excluding pensions and including businesses.
Pensions are a large component of aggregate wealth and their WAS modelling valua-
tions drive several, from this work’s perspective, erroneous, patterns which are important
to analyse and address. Pensions are not necessarily consumable assets at the time of
survey and are thus complex to model, thus some studies exclude available pensions from
wealth, for example Hurd [1989] and Hurd [2002] and some surveys have pension con-
tributions and scheme features but do not offer pension wealth as an item (for example,
ELSA).
The WAS creates valuations for defined contribution (DC) plan holders by directly
asking for respondents’ account value, with probing questions about available financial
statements. Defined benefits (DB) pension plans are valued using models, utilising plan
details combined with discounting assumptions. The Office of National Statistics (ONS)
changes DB modelling assumptions over waves - as stated in the ONS wave 3 report
[2014], newer estimates of previous waves’ aggregate pension wealth were 20-30% lower
and median individual occupational defined benefit plan wealth fell by 45%.
Changes to individual households’ modelled pensions over waves are also substantial
and varied - amongst the top 5% of households, over a third of households have falls or
rises of more than 50% of value.6 These percentage changes represent large monetary
fluctuations and are not supported by corresponding changes in contributions.
In Figure 1.1, wealth excluding pensions shows increases in inequality over time, due
to a combination of concentrating non-pension wealth, removal of pension wealth changes
not beneficial to the wealthy and sample improvements discussed further on. Given the
discussion above, the different changes in inequality over time from the inclusion of pension
wealth are likely due to changes in the measurement and valuation of pension wealth rather
than changes in holdings or behaviour. The value of pension assets broadly declines in the
WAS, due to the modelling changes which produce large individual fluctuations as well
as large aggregate changes. It should be noted that the source of these fluctuations and
changes is DB pensions - DC pension holders do not experience these changes and there
is little difference in wealth concentration statistics or patterns over time when including
or excluding DC pensions from the measure of total wealth.
Having considered pensions, let us examine business wealth. Business wealth is im-
portant amongst the wealthy - amongst the wealthiest 1%, half hold some form of private
business wealth and over a third run their own business or are self employed.7, similar to
US data reported in Cagetti and Nardi [2006], Quadrini [1999] and Quadrini [2000].
The Office of National Statistics [2014] states in their WAS documentation accompa-
nying the dataset that business wealth is excluded from total wealth due to poor response
6Note this is not driven by small pension values - less than a tenth of top 5% households have pension
wealth below £50,000 and only a fifth below £100,000.
7Robust to various definitions of ‘self-employed’.
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Figure 1.1: Shares of wealth held by top x% of households - top 10% (left), top 5%
(middle), top 1% (right). Original ONS wealth measure (red) and after removing pensions
(teal).
rates in initial waves for business valuation, causing concern about representative answers
therein. I argue that complete exclusion of the business data by the ONS (implicitly valu-
ing all businesses at zero, which is by definition biased downwards) is a poor answer to
the problem when data is available.
I propose using a similar approach to the multiple imputation in the SCF for those
respondents not providing numerical business wealth valuation in the WAS cross-sectional
estimates. The ONS uses a similar single imputation procedure to impute data gathered
with error and for complete non-response, prior to data release. The proposed procedure
is focused on the next level, imputing for those who technically ‘respond’ to the question,
but only to state they cannot or will not answer with a value.
Firstly, the WAS improves over the five waves - by wave 4, business value non-response
is near 5%. To exclude this later data is unreasonable. The improvement is predominantly
due to many recorded non-responses truly being valuations of zero, which can be identified
by other survey questions. The response rate is actually 74% and 76% in waves 1 and 2,
as can be seen in Table 1.1. This adjustment improves the response rate and identifies the
unknown value observations where imputation should be used. The figures are similar to
the SCF - over 30% of the 2013 SCF self-employed had zero business wealth, compared to
34-40% in the WAS.
The remaining business data without a valuation (‘Bus. Val. unknown’ in table 1.1) is
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Wave Bus. Val. Bus. Val. Bus. Val. Bus. Val.
>0 = 0 Inferred 0 unknown
2006-08 0.33 0.07 0.34 0.25
2008-10 0.30 0.06 0.40 0.24
2010-12 0.57 0.36 - 0.07
2012-14 0.55 0.40 - 0.05
2014-16 0.54 0.38 - 0.08
Table 1.1: Proportion of self-employed with positive, zero and unknown business value.
a suitable candidate for imputation. Like the SCF, I use multiple imputation by chained
equations (MICE). I apply the procedure to impute the specified business wealth, as well
as some excluded physical wealth in wave 1 in order to use the full sample. An imputation
in this manner requires a good understanding of those not responding to business questions
in order to evaluate if the missing data is conditionally-missing-at-random, i.e. that given
available covariates and predictive variables for whether the observation is missing, the
data is missing at random.
The procedure uses predictive variables to select pools of potential ‘matches’ for ob-
servations with missing values and then draws randomly from this pool. As such, there is
a set of random imputee candidates for the missing data. Multiple imputation does not
just pick one value, but uses the full array of imputed datasets formed by the procedure,
pooling the results from each new dataset in order to construct desired estimates.8 These
results have smaller errors and biases than a single imputation or deleting observations. To
see more of the underlying mechanics, arguments and statistical results surrounding MI,
consult Rubin [1987] or the SCF Federal Reserve paper concerning multiple imputation,
Kennickell [1998].
Business owners that do not provide a valuation are asked why in wave 1 and 2. Some
state reasons which directly imply a valuation of (or very near to) zero - the business
having no financial assets or no market value. The remainder state they are unwilling
to say, unable to say or that they have no records. Some also provide ‘other’ reasons
not available in the end user version of the database. With the variables available in the
WAS covering demographic information, income components, asset portfolios and business
information, the MICE procedure can control for many features of respondents, increasing
the likelihood that the residual data is then conditionally missing at random.
Table 1.2 shows the reasons given by respondents for not providing a value, broken
down by a division within the self-employed definition. Considering all self-employed not
answering (the full population asked the question, marked row “All SE”), a large number of
respondents give a non-response reason implying a direct and clear estimate of zero value,
either “the business has no market value” or “the business has no financial assets”.9. Given
8This study uses Van Buuren’s MICE package in R, van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn [2011], with
the classification and regression tree options with 5 imputed datasets.
9The table covers wave 1 only, but wave 2 is similar
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that these can be reasonably inferred to be an observation of 0, a large proportion of data
is no longer missing and response rates become vastly improved.
Population No business no market unwilling unable no other N
financial assets value to say to say records
All SE 40% 18% 5% 26% 4% 8% 2479
BSE 20% 15% 9% 44% 3% 8% 942
SEO 52% 20% 2% 14% 4% 7% 1537
Table 1.2: Reasons for non-response (“don’t know”) to business valuation, Wave 1, pro-
portion of observations.
The type of response is associated with a key distinction in the self-employment cate-
gories shown in table 1.2, “self-employed in another way” (SEO) are much likely to state
an effective business value of zero under further questioning versus those who are ‘sole
directors’, ‘directors’ or ‘partners’, a group I call “Business Self Employed” (BSE).
The BSE/SEO distinction is an example of a predictive variable used in the MICE
procedure to ensure any differences between respondents that could cause the data not to
be missing-at-random is accounted for. The data shown in this paper uses BSE status;
financial wealth; business features (debt, employees, year of creation); education; sample
weight and age. Different predictor choices have been tested to establish robustness of
results and also, encouragingly, there are no patterns to suggest that characteristics of
members of different non-value answer categories (‘unwilling’, ‘unable’, ‘no records’ and
‘other’) are extremely different.
The distribution of educational qualifications amongst different subsets of business
owners is a particularly interesting variable and shown in table 1.3. Breaking respon-
dents down into those with degrees (‘degree+’), other qualifications (‘other qual’) and no
qualifications (‘no qual’), the respondents who do not answer the valuation question (“No
answer”) appear to be less educated and mathematically skilled than those with positive
business valuations (‘Bus. Val.>0’), but about the same as all self-employed (“All SE”).
Bus. BSE All Bus. No Unwilling Unable No other
Val.>0 SE Val.=0 answer to say to say record
degree 0.31 0.35 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.22 0.25 0.14 0.35
other qual 0.57 0.55 0.58 0.60 0.61 0.66 0.63 0.66 0.51
no qual 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.20 0.14
Table 1.3: Education levels across different business ownership status and non-response
reasons.
In the BSE subset and amongst those stating ‘other’ reasons, there is more likelihood
of a degree. Interestingly, those ‘unable’ to say a business value are more likely to hold
a degree than those ‘unwilling’, suggesting the respondents are not likely to be lacking
educational skills if they claim not to be able to evaluate the business. Those without
business records are substantially less educated, but this difference does not seem to follow
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through into a similar difference in self-reported mathematical ability in table 1.4. Table
1.4 shows respondents by self-assessed mathematical ability. Those ’unwilling’ to provide
a valuation claim to be the most mathematically able on average - alongside entrepreneurs
with positive business value and the BSE.
Bus. BSE All Bus. No Unwilling Unable No other
Val.>0 SE Val.=0 answer to say to say record
excellent 0.37 0.37 0.31 0.27 0.28 0.38 0.28 0.23 0.25
good 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.45 0.50 0.61 0.55
moderate 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.13 0.20 0.15 0.17
poor 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
Table 1.4: Self-reported mathematical ability levels across different business ownership
status and non-response reasons.
Overall, there appears to be no straightforward relationship between the non-valuation
reason and ability proxies. Those who are in the BSE subset are better educated and claim
to be more mathematically able, as do those with positive business valuations (and there
is substantial overlap between the two).
Including business wealth in the measure of total wealth after removing pensions raises
the household top 1% share of wealth by several percentage points in all waves, as shown
in Figure 1.2. The effect of the business value imputation is to further raise the share,
except in wave 1, where the effect of an accompanying physical wealth imputation and
the resulting larger usable dataset ends in a roughly equal top 1% share.10 By the fourth
wave, wealth shares of the top 1% including business wealth imputation and excluding
pensions exceeds 20%.
As indicated above, I also perform multiple imputation for a second variable in wave
1. Physical wealth (vehicles, household contents, collectibles) was only collected for half
of households in wave 1, so the ONS excludes the other half, leaving only 50% of the
sample. This is a dramatic loss of data, especially for the necessarily small subsample of
the top percentiles, and physical wealth is a small part of total wealth (less than 10% of
aggregate wealth). I therefore perform multiple imputation for household physical wealth
in wave 1 to use of the full wave 1 sample both in the general analysis and in business
imputation, leading to a robust dataset. There are higher WAS top wealth shares when
excluding physical wealth as, like the SCF findings of Wolff [1987], physical wealth is
mainly important at the bottom. In total, removing physical wealth raises the top 1%
share by approximately 2 percentage points.
Later waves of the WAS include refreshment samples which have a greater rate of
oversampling of the wealthy (3x versus 2.5x) and developments to the process of identifying
the wealthy. Figure 1.3 shows a calculation for the share of the top 1% using only the
initial sample over the 4 waves, using the original sample plus those recruited in wave 3
10Both imputations are shown together, so all observations for business wealth can be used in imputation.
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Figure 1.2: Shares of wealth held by top x% of households - top 10% (left), top 5%
(middle), top 1% (right). Original ONS wealth measure (red) then, cumulatively, removing
pensions (green), including business wealth (teal) and, finally, imputation of business
wealth (purple).
and then the entire available sample in wave 4. Excluding all new entrants (i.e. without
sample changes), the share of the top 1% experienced a 2007-2009 rise, then a slight fall in
2011-2013. Adding the new wave 3 sample jumps the share, but thereafter the combined
group falls much like the original sample. The new wave 4 sample also increases the share
by their entry, to 22%. The new households from the refreshment samples are wealthier
and increase the wealth share of the very wealthy, accounting for the majority of the rise
in those wealth shares since 2009 when using the entire sample (as opposed to calculations
using the original sample survivors).
The changes in the WAS with newer refreshment samples suggest validation of the data
is a useful exercise. UK estate data contains the officially valued wealth of all deceased
persons over a wealth threshold11. It covers the top 40% of the population and so can
be used, with further assumptions, for calculating the wealth of the top 10, 5, 1 and 0.1
percent groups. For the period WAS data covers, the estate data generate top 1% shares
of 18-20% in Alvaredo et al. [2017]. It is therefore a very useful comparator to consider.
11approximately £5000 for modern data
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Figure 1.3: Share of wealth held by top 1% individuals, using groups starting in wave 1
(W1 only), wave 1 or wave 3 (W1 + W3), waves 1, 3 or 4 (W1 + W3 + W4) or any wave
(W1 + W2 + W3 + W4 + W5).
There are several explanations for the estate data - WAS discrepancy noted in Crossley
et al. [2016], which used the ONS original measure of total wealth. As noted above, the
published WAS top 1% wealth share under that measure is only 12%. Firstly, there are
differences with the measure. WAS reported total wealth excluded business wealth and
included pension wealth, whereas estate data does the opposite. Secondly, the WAS total
wealth measure is at household level, not at person level as per estate data. Therefore, in
my comparison, I adjust WAS data to be comparable to estate data as far as possible to
meet both these points.12
There may also be different coverage of the wealthy and their assets - there are uni-
versal legal valuation requirements at death for estate data but widespread avoidance
and evasion. WAS relies on personal interview valuations instead. The WAS has the
benefit of including data for lower parts of the wealth distribution and for items such as
jointly-held main residences, whereas the estate data includes neither, so must rely on
national accounts and assumptions. Lastly, WAS avoids the selection inherent in valuing
only at point of death, which Alvaredo et al. [2017] attempt to control for using ‘mortality
multipliers’.13
The wealth shares are constructed by summing wealth in a given group and dividing
12See the appendix for details.
13These factors weight the assets of the deceased by an inverse probability of death to recreate a repre-
sentative sample of the living population.
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by the sum of all wealth so I now consider wealth shares before examining the wealth
levels that contribute to the numerator and denominator of those wealth share figures.
The ONS WAS top wealth shares in Figure 1.4 are below those for estate data in all
years, whilst the adjusted sequence I create from the WAS to be comparable to estate data
shows substantially higher inequality than the originals and rises to become approximately
as unequal as estate data over the waves.
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Figure 1.4: Shares of wealth held by top x% of households - top 10% (left), top 5%
(middle), top 1% (right). Estate data from Alvaredo et al Alvaredo et al. [2017] (red),
WAS original base measure (blue), adjusted sequence (black).
Despite the lower wealth shares for the adjusted sequence in early waves, the levels of
average wealth for the comparable wealthy in the WAS have always been equal or higher
than estate data. Figure 1.5 displays the average wealth of different top quantile groups
for the estate series detailed in Alvaredo et al. and the new WAS equivalent series.14
The average wealth held by the WAS top wealth groups exceeds the comparable equiv-
alents for the estate data throughout - i.e. the rich are richer in the WAS. In wave 1, the
WAS average is similar to that of the estate data for the top 1%, at £2.6m as opposed
to the estate data figure of £2.5m. The refreshment samples are responsible for the dra-
matic rise in levels of wealth in wave 3 onwards, but the original wave 1 sample top x%
is still wealthier than the top x% in the estate data throughout. The WAS does not
under-represent wealth at the top versus estate data, despite lower top wealth shares.
Given these higher average levels of wealth amongst the wealthy, the initially lower
14Average wealth in top groups is a rescaled numerator for the equation generating the wealth share
statistic.
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Figure 1.5: Average personal wealth for the top 10% (left), 5% (middle) and 1%(right) in
WAS (blue) and estate data (red)
WAS shares in figure 1.4 must be due to the denominator - aggregate wealth. As shown in
figure 1.6, the total wealth of the population calculated from the WAS is higher than estate
data and closer to the marketable wealth total created from estate data by tax authority
HMRC, “Series C”. The marketable wealth series is not necessarily ‘better’ than the
estate total as, although attempted corrections in Series C are designed to include items
the estate data may not take into account, it contains some assumptions and corrections
sourced from brief and outdated data (Crossley et al. [2016]).
It is not easy to identify exactly where in the distribution the WAS finds extra wealth
to contribute to this larger total in figure 1.6 - estate statistics do not include the lowest
parts of the distribution for direct comparison. The assumptions made about those least
wealthy excluded from the estate statistics do not appear to account for lower aggregate
wealth versus the WAS - on a simple comparison, such persons are actually poorer in the
WAS than in the estate data15. Incomplete recording of jointly held housing from estates
is one potential explanation for these differences in the wealth distribution.
In the estate data analysed by Alvaredo et al. [2017], housing wealth is around 30% of
the assets of the top 1% in estate data over the period the WAS covers. In contrast, the
WAS figure is approximately 45% in wave one, which (monotonically) falls to 30% by the
fourth wave. As shown in figure 1.7, WAS wealth further excluding housing (i.e. leaving
15This is approximately calculated by comparing ‘excluded wealth’ from the estate statistics with wealth
of the lowest x% in the WAS, where x is the share of people not covered by the estate data, i.e. assuming
the poorest in the WAS are also at the bottom for probate recording.
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Figure 1.6: Aggregate Real Wealth Totals from Alvaredo et al Alvaredo et al. [2017],
HMRC Series C Marketable Wealth and WAS.
only business, financial and physical wealth) has a top 1% share of around 30% and is a
similar level to estate data in later waves. Again, the WAS equals or exceeds the estate
data in levels of wealth for the top quantiles. The wealthy are still wealthier in the WAS
when excluding housing, despite lower shares of wealth for top groups.
A second, brief, validation is also of interest - income data in the WAS. Compared
to the World Income Database (WID) UK figures, there are similar top shares of total
income among adults, with top 1% shares of around 12% before tax and 9% after tax.
When restricting total income to taxpayers only, the WAS broadly matches the UK Survey
of Personal Income administrative data (SPI), except for near to the top 1%, where the
WAS quantile is around 10% lower.
For investment income amongst taxpayers, the top 10% consistently have 85-90% of
investment income in the WAS, whilst the SPI in Alvaredo et al lists approximately 75%.16.
The WAS investment income and rent total is broadly the same, when adjusting for the
exclusion of ‘non-profits serving households’ (NPISH) in the WAS data.17
The identification and processing of ‘taxpayers’ in the WAS is likely to be a major
source of differences as, in end-user data, one needs to infer/model tax payments from
different income items, some of which are gathered pre-tax and others post-tax. Further
16except in years of tax reform
17The WAS total is £50,000m in wave 3, whereas the comparable figure from national accounts/SPI
data is £75,000m. NPISH consistently receive 20-30% of the total investment income when statistics are
available. Thus a reasonable benchmark to total WAS investment income is £55,000m. Around 5% of
responders did not know their investment income, so the WAS figure is close.
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Figure 1.7: Wealth shares of Top 10, 5 and 1%, excluding housing. Estate data from
Alvaredo et al. [2017] (red), WAS person level including imputation(blue) and without
(green).
discussion of this procedure and explanation for why these figures are likely to slightly
overtax the wealthy can be found in the Appendix.
As a further comparison, the Sunday Times Rich List18 aims to identify the richest
1000 persons or households in the U.K.19 and catalogue their wealth by a combination of
interviews, compiling publicly available information and their own investigations. The vast
majority of this wealth is privately held businesses, public stocks or property. The team
excludes wealth in private bank accounts and other sources they cannot access. They
endeavour to value the private businesses and track changes in ownership. The wealth
in this list is substantially above that of the survey - the top 1000 is less than 0.002%
of the population and the entry threshold for the 2018 group is over £110 million. In
comparison, the top survey member has less than £50 million in wealth. Alvaredo et al.
[2017] catalogue estimated Pareto coefficients based upon this list and from estate data,
each of which we compare to the survey data below. The differing scale makes the rich list
and survey difficult to compare, except by Pareto coefficients. The Pareto, or ‘Power Law’,
distribution describes a fat tail above a threshold c, with the following (scaled) cumulative
distribution function in that tail,
18https://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/richlist
19U.K. resident or with a significant presence there
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P (X ≤ x) =
(
c
x
)α
with the coefficient α. α is an important parameter defining the distribution and its
relation to top wealth shares is one motivating reason for the focus on top shares of wealth
in the literature. α can be estimated in a number of ways - graphical log-log plots and
regressions; maximum likelihood fitting and shares within shares. To be easily comparable,
we follow Alvaredo et al. [2017] and use the shares-within-shares method for the WAS to
find the inverse coefficient β = α/(α−1). β is positively correlated with the fatness of the
tail and inequality in terms of higher wealth shares.20 The Pareto distribution assumes
that β is constant at all points within the tail - something that I find, like Alvaredo et al.
[2017], does not hold. In Figure 1.8 we see that the WAS shows an equal or higher β than
the rich list data21, meaning there is equal or higher inequality amongst the wealthy in the
survey versus the super-rich in the rich list. We also see in Figure 1.9 that for the available
estate data the WAS has similar Pareto-Lorenz coefficients22. The WAS data has a higher
β for data in higher parts of the distribution as time passes in line with the arguments
earlier concerning better sampling and an increase in wealth inequality amongst the very
wealthy.
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Figure 1.8: Inverted Pareto-Lorenz coefficients for the WAS and the Sunday Times Rich
List.
20Whereas α is inversely correlated with the wealth share.
21Pareto coefficients reproduced from Alvaredo et al. [2017]
22Pareto coefficients reproduced from Alvaredo et al. [2017]
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Figure 1.9: Inverted Pareto-Lorenz coefficients for the WAS and Estate Data.
Finally, one important cross-sectional inequality comparison is the work of Vermeulen
[2016], who investigates the ability of wealth surveys to represent the wealthiest by com-
bining the survey data with wealth information from rich lists of billionaires to estimate
power law parameters. For the WAS, he estimates an original wealth share for the top 1%
in wave 2 of 13% and 14-18% when including the rich list data. My analysis has shown
that the WAS top 1% wealth share fits into this range after adding business wealth even
with no other changes.
To conclude this section, stripping out refreshment sample effects, there has been a
small rise in top wealth shares over 2007-2015. Rising top wealth shares over the period is
otherwise attributable to better sampling of the wealthy in later waves. I claim the WAS
data is suitable for the study of top of distribution inequality in all waves by validation
against estate data and available rich list data. The WAS represents the wealthy at least
as well as the estate data in levels of wealth, as lower top shares in early years are due to
higher aggregate wealth in the survey.
1.4 Transitions and Mobility
1.4.1 Wealth Mobility
In this section, we study transitions and changes in wealth for households. Unless
otherwise specified, we use the measure defined in the previous section of financial, busi-
ness, property and physical wealth. The following results are robust to different wealth
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definitions and longitudinal weighting schemes.
Table 1.5 presents various transition probabilities for different groups of wealthy house-
holds commonly studied in the literature23. More than one third of the top percentile exit
in two years, whilst the 8 year exit rate is 50%.24 Membership in higher percentile groups
(going right across table 1.5) is generally more unstable and there is greater probability
of transitioning downwards, despite larger gaps between the higher thresholds.
Years Top 10% Top 5% Top 1% Top 0.1%
07-09 0.72 0.68 0.58 0.41
09-11 0.77 0.73 0.64 0.5
11-13 0.79 0.74 0.67 0.44
13-15 0.79 0.75 0.71 0.49
07-15 0.65 0.64 0.52 0.5
Table 1.5: Proportion of households staying in top wealth quantile groups across waves
I find similar patterns in both the U.K. ELSA and both the 07/09 and 1983/89 SCF
(latter from Kennickell and Starr-McCluer [1997]) as shown in Table 1.6 and 1.7 The SCF
07-09 transitions are similar to the WAS 07-09, but show less mobility than the WAS,
while the 83/89 SCF is more mobile than the WAS 6-year transitions (though this may
be due to the different eras). I also note that in Hurst et al. [1998], the PSID has a
proportion staying in the top 10% over 5-years of 64%-69%, which is similar to the WAS
6-year staying rate of 65%-72%. ELSA’s staying rates are somewhat lower than those in
the WAS, but the ELSA figures are otherwise similar, despite being drawn from a smaller
sample which does not use oversampling to represent the very top. The ELSA sample for
the top 0.1% is very small and thus highly variable, a problem which the WAS also has
above the top 0.1%, though to a lesser degree.
Source Top 10% Top 5% Top 1% Top 0.1%
SCF 07-09 0.78 0.81 0.66 0.56
WAS 07-09 0.72 0.68 0.58 0.41
SCF 83-89 0.41 0.52 0.59
WAS 07-13 0.65 0.64 0.52 0.5
WAS 09-15 0.72 0.65 0.57 0.42
Table 1.6: Proportion of households staying in top wealth quantile groups across
waves,WAS and SCF
Studying exit from the top categories over different horizons in Table 1.8, we see that
the proportion remaining in the category decreases as the time horizon expands, so there
is a lower probability of staying for a longer time. However, after the first transition
(of 2 years), further transitions have a much lower impact on the proportion remaining.
Considering the 2007 start, whilst there is a 42% chance of exiting in the first two years,
23Note that for this dynamic analysis, the multiple imputation for business value from above cannot be
used, as it is only valid cross-sectionally.
24much above the (Markov) compound of individual wave-to-wave staying probabilities
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top 10% top 5% top 1% top 0.1%
1-2 0.71 0.65 0.52 0.10
2-3 0.73 0.70 0.45 0.51
3-4 0.73 0.66 0.46 0.18
4-5 0.74 0.64 0.49 0.00
5-6 0.73 0.65 0.44 0.00
6-7 0.74 0.70 0.59 0.00
Table 1.7: ELSA: Staying rates in top wealth groups over waves.
the chance for exiting in 8 years is 52%. The transition over the financial crisis of 2007-
2009 has higher exit rates and mobility, but the 2007 cohort retains a similar pattern as
the time window expands over multiple waves. We also find the same pattern in ELSA’s
statistics, although not at the level of the top 1%.
Years Top 10% Top 5% Top 1%
07-09 0.72 0.68 0.58
07-11 0.71 0.68 0.59
07-13 0.68 0.63 0.55
07-15 0.65 0.64 0.52
09-11 0.77 0.73 0.64
09-13 0.76 0.7 0.6
09-15 0.72 0.65 0.57
11-13 0.79 0.74 0.67
11-15 0.77 0.72 0.61
Table 1.8: Proportion of households staying in top wealth quantile groups over time
As an illustration of the substantial wealth fluctuations involved in these transitions, I
show the quantiles of the percentage change distribution for the top 5% in table 1.9 and the
top 1% in table 1.10. I note the very substantial losses indicated by the lower quartile and
lowest decile - for Decile 1 (Q(0.1)), 45-60% of wealth lost, for reference this loss is around
£600-800,000. There is an even wider distribution of losses amongst the top 1%, with a
quarter losing over 35% of their wealth. For both groups, the distribution of changes is
shifted downwards during the 07-09 transition which coincides with the financial crisis,
particularly affecting the top 1%.
Years Q(0.1) Q(0.25) Q(0.5) Q(0.75) Q(0.9)
07-09 -0.6 -0.34 -0.09 0.14 0.42
09-11 -0.46 -0.23 -0.02 0.19 0.54
11-13 -0.49 -0.24 -0.01 0.18 0.53
13-15 -0.48 -0.2 0.03 0.24 0.54
Table 1.9: Quantiles of Proportional Changes in Wealth for Top 5%
Table 1.11 displays before and after statistics for those in the top 5% who experience
a fall of 25% or more in their wealth between two waves versus the remainder of the top
5%25. The self-employed are over-represented in those with large falls and a substantial
25I use the fourth and fifth wave, though other waves are similar, as are the averages.
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Years Q(0.1) Q(0.25) Q(0.5) Q(0.75) Q(0.9)
07-09 -0.78 -0.55 -0.23 0.12 0.56
09-11 -0.65 -0.35 -0.03 0.23 0.72
11-13 -0.69 -0.39 -0.07 0.17 0.52
13-15 -0.77 -0.38 -0.03 0.22 0.65
Table 1.10: Quantiles of Proportional Changes in Wealth for Top 1%
proportion of these exit self-employment after their fall. I show the median (Q0.5) and top
quartile (Q0.75) of the proportion of total wealth held as business wealth amongst these
self-employed in the second and third row. On the left, the ‘before’ figures show big fallers
have a larger proportion of their wealth in their business (versus the other self-employed in
the top 5%) before their fall. After their fall, their wealth in their business is substantially
reduced.
Those big fallers with large proportions of financial wealth (75th percentile and above
in terms of proportion of wealth held in financial wealth) before the transition experience
a large reduction in that proportion, roughly halving the size of their financial portfolio
versus their other remaining assets. Big fallers have a lower allocation towards property
wealth, the proportion of which rises after their fall, indicating their non-property assets
are having greater reductions than property assets26.
Fall >-25% Others
Before After Before After
Proportion Self-employed 0.34 0.21 0.27 0.25
Self-employed Q0.5 % bus. wealth 0.44 0 0.03 0.06
Self-employed Q0.75 % bus. wealth 0.76 0.27 0.41 0.42
Median % financial wealth 0.18 0.13 0.24 0.21
Q0.75 % financial wealth 0.58 0.27 0.42 0.4
Median % housing wealth 0.35 0.66 0.56 0.59
Table 1.11: Statistics for subsets of Top 5%, before & after transitions.
Examining income, we find a similar pattern for top incomes in table 1.12 when com-
pared to the top wealth transitions in table 1.5. The figures are broadly similar to rates
of exit from top income groups in the US found by Guvenen et al. [2014a], Auten et al.
[2013] and Kopczuk et al. [2007].27
One of the full transition matrices generating the staying rates can be seen in table
1.13, depicting agent’s current status by row, and future status given current status in
columns. Whilst there is concentration around the diagonal - i.e. that larger moves across
wealth categories are less likely than smaller moves, there is significant likelihood of falling
very far down the wealth ladder. Amongst the 48% that leave the top 1% over 8 years in
Table 1.14, 20% fall out below the top 5%, and this represents a loss of at least several
26Note WAS cannot distinguish between asset sales for consumption and intrinsic losses. Thus the
tendency to sell other assets before illiquid property may be showing here.
27One should note that the top x% in wealth and top x% in income are not all the same people when
interpreting these patterns. About half of these respective top 1%’s overlap.
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Years Top 10% Top 5% Top 1% Top 0.1%
07-09 0.62 0.54 0.27 0.28
09-11 0.61 0.55 0.44 0.42
11-13 0.61 0.57 0.6 0.48
13-15 0.62 0.57 0.5 0.59
07-15 0.46 0.4 0.25 0.42
Table 1.12: Proportion of households staying in top gross income quantile groups across
waves
million pounds. In short, wealth can be very volatile, even for the wealthy. This also
aligns with SCF 07/09 panel findings from Bricker et al. [2011] and the 1980’s results from
Kennickell and Starr-McCluer [1997]. Other years in the WAS show similar patterns.
from/to <top 10% top 5-10% top 1-5% top 1%
<top 10% 0.97 0.02 0.01 0.00
top 5-10% 0.37 0.47 0.15 0.00
top 1-5% 0.10 0.23 0.60 0.07
top 1% 0.02 0.01 0.36 0.61
Table 1.13: Transitional Probabilities for HH WAS wealth categories 09-11.
from/to <top 10% top 10% top 5% top 1%
<top 10% 0.96 0.03 0.01 0.00
top 5-10% 0.53 0.31 0.16 0.00
top 1-5% 0.20 0.22 0.49 0.09
top 1% 0.12 0.02 0.37 0.5
Table 1.14: Transitional Probabilities for HH WAS wealth categories across waves 1-5
(07-15), household wealth.
There is a strong persistence in continued membership of top wealth categories despite
the relatively high group exit rates from wave to wave. Table 2.2 shows the probability of
staying conditional on history of membership. Those with longer past membership have
a much higher probability of remaining in the group, whereas new entrants have a very
high chance of exit.28 Again, ELSA data contains similar findings which are shown in the
Appendix.
top 10% top 5% top 1%
P (T4|F1F2T3) 0.48 0.39 0.30
P (T4|F1T2T3) 0.75 0.68 0.66
P (T4|T1T2T3) 0.91 0.88 0.87
Table 1.15: Probability of remaining in top wealth groups given different histories. ‘Tt’
indicates ‘True’ for belonging to the group in wave t and ‘Ft’ indicates ‘False’ for the same.
We can study more of the distribution of individual wealth changes using a non-
parametric quantile regression and plots of resulting quantiles, similar to Trede [1998].
28The top 0.1% must be excluded from this conditional analysis as there are too few observations for
some categories.
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top 10% top 5% top 1%
P (T4|F1F2T3) 0.34 0.29 0.29
P (T4|F1T2T3) 0.69 0.70 0.45
P (T4|T1T2T3) 0.87 0.82 0.67
Table 1.16: ELSA: Conditional staying rates in top wealth groups (3-stage). Notation as
per previous table.
The different quantile levels at each x-axis point show the distribution of outcomes at
that point. Thus figure 1.10 shows the deciles of wave 3 wealth at each level of wave 2
wealth, much like a series of localised box plots. As an example, households at 4 times
median wealth (x-axis=4) in 2009 have a wide range of outcomes - the top 10% (violet,
D9) of those households have 5x median wealth in 2011, whilst the lowest 10% (red, D1)
have approximately 2.5x median wealth. Considering the whole figure, the range of wealth
changes increases as wealth increases.
Figure 1.10: Non-linear Quantile Regression for relative-to-median wealth in 2011 vs 2009.
Deciles (D1-9) of Wt for a given Wt−1.
The patterns in Figure 1.10 are representative of results from other waves and time
horizons, as all are very similar. Further diagrams can be found in the Appendix.
Both the slope and the spread of the quantiles indicate mobility features. A lower
slope would imply greater mobility, due to weaker local-linear dependence on previous
wealth29. Similarly, a greater distance between different quantiles at a point would also
29An illustrative example is completely horizontal quantile lines, which implies full independence of
current wealth from previous wealth, as all across the x-axis face the same outcome quantiles and probability
distribution
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indicate greater mobility through variance for a household at that point.
Under this analysis, as wealth data shows neither substantially lower slopes nor greater
spread over longer time horizons, it indicates that mobility is not substantially higher over
the longer horizon of 8, 6 or 4 years versus 2 years.
The wealth quantile dependencies show in Figure 1.10 are well described by a linear
relationship (as shown in Appendix). Linear quantile regression coefficients can be easily
compared over time horizons to describe mobility differences. Using a quantile regression
for deciles of current wealth given wealth in 2007, we observe that both the intercepts and
slopes for the 2007 wealth variable are very similar, as shown in Figure 1.11. This also
indicates that mobility does not greatly increase over 8 years as opposed to 2. However,
there is an increased spread of slope coefficients for the 6 and 8 year regressions, and so
there is some evidence of greater mobility in wealth over longer periods of time.
Figure 1.11: Linear Quantile Regression Coefficients for Relative Wealth on Relative
Wealth 2007.
Figure 1.12 shows changes in log wealth versus the quantile of previous wealth in the
distribution. The distribution of changes is quite substantial over the whole distribution
of wealth (from the lowest percentile to highest), with many households gaining or losing
0.25 or 0.5 log points of wealth. Of particular importance, the very wealthiest have a much
wider, and slightly lower, ∆log(w) distribution, whilst the poor below the 4th Decile have
a wide but much more positive distribution of proportional wealth change outcomes. For
households from the 4th Decile to the 9th Decile, the distribution of log wealth changes
faced is broadly the same. Of particular note is the very substantially larger negative tail
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for the top 2%.
Figure 1.12: Non-Linear Quantile Regression for Changes in Log Wealth vs Quantile of
Wealth.
Figure 1.13 shows the first four moments of changes in log wealth, conditional on
wealth quantile (using kernel methods). Visually, readers can note the remarkable general
similarity to moments of change in log income distributions found in Guvenen, Karahan,
Ozkan and Song’s study of SSA earnings data (Guvenen et al. [2015]) - variance and skew
both U-shaped with the latter negative, whilst kurtosis is substantial and hump-shaped.
30 The results for the mean and variance particularly align with those from the previous
quantile diagrams, whilst the skew and kurtosis are less clearly intuitable. We do not
observe the increase in negative skew that is observed in the American earnings data over
the recessionary transition.
30Despite this being in different countries, for wealth rather than income and for households rather than
tax units.
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Figure 1.13: Moments for the Change in Log Wealth distribution over quantiles of previous
wealth: ∆log(Wt) by τ = FWt−1(Wt−1)
Since there are 5 waves, one can also consider the distribution of changes in log wealth
conditional on previous changes in log wealth in Figure 1.14. There is some reversion,
shown by the generally negative slope of the quantile functions, but there is also a spread
of quantiles further from the x-origin in both directions. This can be interpreted as those
households experiencing large changes then continuing to experience large changes, regard-
less of direction31. This dependence weakens over a longer horizon when one compares the
11-13 vs 07-09 diagram versus the 09-11 vs 07-09 diagram displayed. The longer horizon
plot is both flatter and relatively smaller in spread, appearing closer to independence32.
31Although the bottom 20% and top 10% in wealth are overweighted for ∆log(W ) > 0.5 and ∆log(W ) <
−0.5 respectively, removing these high and low wealth observations does not change the findings.
32As mentioned earlier, independence shown in this visualisation would be a series of horizontal lines.
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Figure 1.14: Non-Linear Quantile Regression showing Deciles of Differenced Log Wealth
2011-2009 vs Differenced Log Wealth 2009-2007.
1.4.2 Predicting Wealth Changes and Measurement Error
In wealth survey data, it is good practise to consider the possibility and strength of
measurement error in the data. Before considering measurement error, I briefly examine
whether the above wealth changes are easily predictable. I use the top 5% (n=1500) for
a logistic regression model to predict whether a household continues to be a member of
the top 5% in the next wave 33. Although it does not very successfully predict the binary
of whether a household leaves or not, it does separate the data into two groups - one
predicted as very unlikely to leave ( ˆPstay > 0.85) versus a group forecast to be more likely
to leave ( ˆPstay ≈ 0.55). The highly likely stayers are wealthier, income richer, not self-
employed and have proportionally less business/financial wealth34 as well as less likely to
33as in Table 1.5
34Therefore, inversely, relatively more housing and physical wealth. However, portfolios are much less
explanatory than income and wealth.
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have extreme negative income changes. I also fit continuous regression models to changes
in log wealth and find an out-of-sample R2 of 0.15-0.24.35 Income variables alone have an
out of sample R2 not above 0.05.
In the first wave of the survey, participants are asked to predict their “financial sit-
uation” in two years. Examining a basic breakdown of wealth changes conditional on
participants’ view of their future circumstances in Table 1.17, those predicting worse per-
sonal circumstances are actually slightly more likely to gain wealth over 07-09 and their
predictions are insignificant when used in modelling.
Situational Probability
prediction (07 to 09) better off in 2009
not asked 0.46
better off 0.36
worse off 0.41
same 0.35
don’t know 0.31
Table 1.17: Breakdown of proportion of top 5% respondents gaining wealth (w2−w1 > 0)
by those respondents’ predictions of their future financial situation.
To confidently use survey data to identify wealth dynamics, measurement error is an
important issue. Mechanically, simple noise in log wealth would reduce the appearance
of persistence and can cause bias in a variety of estimates. Neri and Ranalli [2012] and
Neri and Monteduro [2013] tackle measurement error in the SHIW using information from
connected bank details and find significant underestimation of assets amongst the more
wealthy. They do not identify time varying measurement error, but do find connections
between education, wealth and income and the underestimation or overestimation of assets.
To account for measurement error in the dynamic moments that I have presented, I
utilise the panel element of the data to identify this. Lee et al. [2017] studies the Korean
Labour and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) and finds, using a set of instruments together
with a panel estimation, an approximately equal split between measurement error and
‘true’ residual variation in individual household consumption and income and I use a
similar approach.
As WAS is a dynamic (longitudinal) panel where fixed effects ensure any dynamic
estimation would be inconsistent without the use of differencing and instruments, I use
the strategies of Holtz-Eakin et al. [1988], Arellano and Bond [1991] and Anderson and
Hsiao [1982]. These all use previous lagged values of the dynamic variable in question as
instruments for estimation.
In this case, observed wealth wi,t is the dynamic variable of interest. Throughout, all
variables are in logs, and I assume that there is classical i.i.d. measurement error (which
is thus be multiplicative for actual wealth) with some variance σ2v . Hence, the estimating
35Please see appendix for more details.
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equation is,
wi,t = ρwi,t−1 + βXi,t + αi + i,t
Except,
wi,t = w
∗
i,t + vi,t
Where w∗i,t is ‘true’ wealth. For estimation, the equation is differenced to remove
αi (fixed effects) and the methodology would normally use wi,t−2 (and further back) as
instruments to estimate ρ. But, in a world with measurement error, wi,t−2 is no longer a
valid instrument as it contains a link between differenced measurement error ∆vi,t−1 and
∆wi,t−1, the differenced right-hand-side regressor. Yet wi,t−3 and beyond remain valid
instruments.
If measurement error is restricted to be zero mean, i.i.d. and with homogeneous
variance (as above) then the residuals from the differenced equation ut (a function of
ρˆ) can be used to identify the variance of the measurement error and equation error,
E(utut) = 2σ
2
 + 2(1 + ρ+ ρ
2)σ2v
E(utut−1) = −σ2 − (1 + 2ρ+ ρ2)σ2v
which can be solved for σ2 and σ
2
v . Further lags on u can be used to create more
restrictions (which can be used for ELSA, but WAS is too short with only 5 periods).
With the added assumption of normality, the distribution is fully defined and can then
be used to generate simulated output.
I use a bootstrap to find the distribution of estimates, much like Lee et al. [2017],
running dynamic panel regressions using difference GMM, as per Arellano-Bond.36 Below
are shown estimated results from WAS at both household- and individual-level for σv, σ
and ρ, as well as from ELSA.
Measurement error standard deviation is approximately half of true residual error
standard deviation in both individual and household WAS, somewhat lower than Lee et
al’s results of an approximately equally sized σv and σ for income and consumption in
KLIPS. Persistence ρ is not extremely high, though it should be noted that this is after
fixed effects and co-regressor effects. The persistence confidence interval is smaller for
WAS when dealing with individuals. Whilst ELSA only includes adults aged over 50, it
provides a useful benchmark and results are similar, though with somewhat lower ρ and
a 1:1 ratio of σv:σ.
36Other variables included are lags and polynomials of self-employment flag, business ownership, years
in current job, degree holding, age, and income (including investment income), detailed in the appendix.
Negative variance results are excluded throughout.
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Data Feature Mean Q0.05 Q0.5 Q0.95 Std. Dev.
WAS Household σv 0.104 0.041 0.106 0.158 0.035
σ 0.206 0.149 0.201 0.279 0.045
ρ 0.453 0.011 0.446 0.930 0.293
WAS Individual σv 0.111 0.038 0.113 0.176 0.041
σ 0.307 0.270 0.306 0.346 0.025
ρ 0.533 0.275 0.518 0.857 0.179
ELSA σv 0.186 0.077 0.198 0.253 0.054
σ 0.203 0.089 0.209 0.287 0.060
ρ 0.307 0.147 0.295 0.503 0.112
σv + OIDR 0.182 0.000 0.204 0.277 0.079
σ + OIDR 0.181 0.000 0.199 0.285 0.086
Table 1.18: Bootstrap Measurement error results. “OIDR” refers to use of overidentifying
restrictions.
1.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, I investigated the WAS dataset and the evidence on the wealth at
the top and dynamics of wealthy households. I showed that the WAS information on the
wealthy includes greater wealth and inequality than estate data and that lower shares of
wealth versus estate data are due to a higher aggregate wealth figure. I discussed business
wealth data in the WAS and showed that later waves have little missing data and are
safe to use, whilst multiple imputation can be used for earlier waves. I found that the
wealthiest 1% of households in the UK hold 20% of total wealth, and inclusion of business
wealth is important to that figure. The WAS sampling and representation of the wealthy
improves over waves, yet defined benefit pension wealth is difficult to use and generates
spurious patterns in inequality. Comparing the WAS dataset to both estate data and the
rich list of the top 1000 in the UK, the WAS data does not under-represent the wealth of
the wealthy and shows similar inequality features at the top to other sources.
I then discuss the new moments and facts this data contributes to the literature -
transitions in wealth at the top. I find rich wealth dynamics amongst the wealthy, including
high probabilities of exiting the richest wealth categories, with one third exiting every two
years and half every six years. I compare these transitions to available data from other
surveys - including the SCF and PSID from the U.S. and ELSA in the U.K., finding similar
patterns and results. Wealth transitions have significantly negative skew and high kurtosis.
Kurtosis is particularly high at the very top, and variance decreases with wealth until the
top 5% whereafter wealth and variance increase together for those above the 95th quantile.
Quantile regressions indicate that the very wealthy suffer great variability in wealth. Those
at the very top, above the 95th quantile, experience a wider distribution of changes in log
wealth than those below, and the distribution widens as one moves further up the tail of
the wealth distribution. I investigate those at the top who experience particularly large
falls in wealth and find that they are more likely to be self-employed or a business owner
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and hold proportionally more business and financial wealth. Importantly, business wealth
of those who experience large falls in wealth is the element of their wealth which suffers
the especially large falls.
I note the existence of a pattern whereby those in a top wealth group, such as the
top 1%, have a higher probability of staying in that group versus newer entrants to the
group and investigate the possibility of measurement error. Using an AR1 dynamic panel
estimation strategy, I identify the variance of time-varying i.i.d. measurement error and
‘true’ residual error, finding that measurement error variance is approximately half the
size of ‘true’ error variance in the WAS (a 1:2 ratio). Noting the same pattern occurs in
ELSA, I also examine that dataset with the same methodology and find a 1:1 ratio.
I therefore conclude that the WAS dataset offers new and interesting insights, especially
at the top of the wealth distribution. The results I have presented do not encompass the
full depth of rich information in the dataset, which includes risk and saving attitudes,
breakdown of debts and inheritance information, amongst a host of other variables. There
is great scope for future work and insights for this data.
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Chapter 2
Wealth and Mobility: Superstars,
Returns Heterogeneity and
Discount Factors
The wealthy hold a large fraction of total wealth but to what extent do they stay
wealthy over time? What theory explains both cross-sectional inequality and the dynam-
ics of wealthy households? This chapter uses the longitudinal UK Wealth and Assets
Survey (WAS) to answer these questions. I examine three main theories for the highly
concentrated distribution of wealth against the data - heterogeneous returns to wealth,
temporary high earnings and discount factor heterogeneity. I identify heterogeneous re-
turns to wealth as the theory that best explains the inequality and mobility data and
I corroborate my findings with a model which combines all three mechanisms. This re-
sult occurs because poor heterogeneous wealth returns realisations simultaneously reduce
stocks of wealth and discourage future saving through expected persistence in wealth re-
turns. This generates very large downwards mobility. My estimated model matches both
wealth inequality and mobility moments and can show that, structurally, 12% of the top
1% leave this category within two years and 25% leave within six years.
2.1 Introduction
Inequality, the behaviour of the wealthy and the distribution of wealth have long been
topics of discussion for economists. Recently, inequality has become more prominent in
policy and academic questions and the implications of heterogeneous wealth distributions
to economic and policy questions is still being widely explored.1 The very wealthiest hold
a large fraction of wealth in most developed economies, so much so that the rich right
tail of the empirical cross-sectional wealth distribution often follows a fat-tailed Pareto
1For example, the recent announcement of a wide-ranging Institute of Fiscal Studies review on inequality
headed by Angus Deaton.
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distribution. In this chapter, I focus on the mobility of the wealthy in that tail. I use
data on both inequality and mobility to evaluate quantitative theories of inequality. The
incomplete markets Aiyagari-Hugget-Bewley framework, often used by macroeconomists
to generate a non-trivial distribution of wealth through self-insurance buffer stock savings
against earnings shocks, cannot create the thick right tail and concentration found in the
data. Hence, three main theories of tail wealth accumulation have been proposed - hetero-
geneous returns to wealth; temporary ‘superstar’ high earnings state(s) and discount factor
heterogeneity. Using the data, I estimate a structural model to identify which mechanisms
are driving inequality and mobility, and the parameters governing those mechanisms.
Understanding the drivers of wealth inequality is key to the implications of many het-
erogeneous agent macroeconomic models. For example, Kindermann and Krueger [2014]
find optimal tax on top earners to be over 90% with an exogenous ‘superstar’ earnings
process whilst the entrepreneurial model used by Cagetti and Nardi [2004] shows that re-
ducing estate tax and raising income tax is welfare decreasing. Ocampo et al. [2017] find
efficiency through improved capital allocation under wealth taxation and Carroll et al.
[2017a] argue that wealth differences resulting from preference heterogeneity is important
to household consumption responses.
Motivated by the need to distinguish the driving force behind wealth inequality, I utilise
the UK Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS) panel dataset. As described earlier, this wealth
survey is significantly larger than its peers, is longitudinal and it oversamples the wealthy
to capture them accurately. This allows us to study wealth transitions amongst those at
the top and to use that data to evaluate different explanations for top wealth inequality. I
therefore apply moments from the data to a Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari incomplete markets
framework2 with the three additional explanations to generate realistic inequality.
De Nardi [2015] and De Nardi and Fella [2017] examine major hypotheses about ex-
tensive wealth accumulation: earnings and income risks; idiosyncratic returns and wealth
risk; heterogeneous saving/risk preferences; bequests, human capital and altruism towards
descendants; medical expenses and, lastly, entrepreneurship. I choose to focus on the first
three in this chapter, though the model also incorporates some stylistic features of bequests
and inheritance.
Very high ‘superstar’ earnings states (Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez and Rios-Rull [2003])
that last a limited period of time have been found to generate very high wealth inequality.
Superstardom is temporary such that households save most of their earnings due to knowl-
edge that they will eventually lose superstar status and will want to use these savings to
smooth their consumption over time. Due to the extreme level of the earnings state, these
wealth stocks can be very large, generating the high inequality found in the data.
Benhabib, Bisin and Zhu [2014] and Benhabib, Bisin and Luo [2015]) offer an alter-
2The key papers for this literature being Aiyagari [1994], Huggett [1996] and Bewley [1983]
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native explanation in the form of exogenous heterogeneous returns to wealth. They show
that a distribution of returns can replicate cross-sectional wealth inequality and has sim-
ple implications for mobility. In this theory, wealthy agents are those who experience a
series of excessive returns - as they become richer the impact of greater returns increases,
leading to a process that generates a fat tail of a few wealthy agents who control very large
asset holdings. Non-perfect persistence of the returns process (including birth and death)
ensures that wealth does not excessively concentrate, leading to a Pareto distribution.
Discount factor heterogeneity, as used by Krusell and Smith [1998], Hendricks [2004]
and Carroll et al [2017a] explains wealth heterogeneity by different weightings on future
consumption, often labelled as ‘patience’ or a desire to smooth consumption. Explanations
from this theory are rarely targeted at the very wealthy tail, as Hendricks notes, and relies
on more patient households accumulating greater asset holdings due to greater desire to
save for the future and to keep their consumption stream smooth.
Understanding the dynamics of the wealthy and how they come to be wealthy is im-
portant in and of itself - is there a dominant perpetual ‘rentier’ class who live from their
income? Or are the wealthy better characterised as the lucky tail of portfolio risk? Are they
recipients of sudden rewards for extraordinary skills or gradual wealth builders? Whilst we
can identify the cross-sectional features of the wealthy - more likely to be entrepreneurs,
hold more stocks, be slightly older - we need longitudinal data to understand their dy-
namics, and to discipline mechanisms that claim to represent and drive the distribution
of wealth.
This chapter use the features of those at the top of the wealth distribution, including
the changes in wealth faced by top households, which I extensively analysed in the earlier
chapter concerning the WAS data. To summarise, there are substantial wealth and income
mobility at the top in the raw data, where around a third of the wealthiest 1% exit this
group biennially and are unlikely to return. After six years, half of the wealthiest 1% have
exited that category.
Using the WAS data moments, my main finding is that returns heterogeneity is the
mechanism that best explains the data. This is because it has the ability to generate
larger and faster downward mobility than other mechanisms. It can do so because it has
two effects, one directly affecting the agent’s budget constraint and one behavioural effect
through expected future returns. Agents with particularly poor realisations of returns will
experience falls in their wealth stock. This can force rapid changes in wealth, depending
on the persistence of returns and degree of variance. Poor returns also feeds through
into an incentive not to hold wealth if one expects poor returns to continue in future,
causing further de-accumulation. In contrast, superstars de-accumulate slowly after losing
their very high earnings as there is no downward pressure on their wealth except grad-
ual consumption-smoothing pressures. Discount factor shocks only operate through the
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behavioural channel of expected value of future wealth, not affecting the agent’s budget
constraint or resources.
The estimated returns heterogeneity has a positive yearly autocorrelation of approx-
imately 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.1 in the joint model with all three theories of
inequality present. This volatility is in the region of direct wealth return heterogeneity
estimates by Fagereng, Guiso, Malacrino and Pistaferri [2016] using Norwegian admin-
istrative wealth tax datasets. As a benchmark, the unconditional yearly wealth returns
standard deviation is 0.16 versus Campbell’s 0.5-0.6 for a single U.S. public stock (Camp-
bell [2001]). The other two mechanisms do not substantially contribute to explaining
inequality in the joint estimation.
I correct for time-varying measurement error, as this can play a quantitatively impor-
tant role in wealth survey data3. I still find substantial mobility after the correction, with
around 12% leaving the top 1% every two years and 25% every six years. Without this
correction attributing some variation to measurement error, returns heterogeneity would
be even more prominent as the most successful mechanism since it is the only one that can
accommodate rapid and large wealth changes and thus greater variation in wealth favours
it.
2.2 Data: The Wealth and Assets Survey
In this section I describe the WAS data used and the wealthy within it, building a
picture of their relevant characteristics. As stated earlier, the WAS is a biennial panel
survey dataset covering wealth, income and demographics for UK households and thus
supplies useful moments with which to estimate theories of wealth inequality. In my
chapter on the WAS data, I examine the WAS in detail, comparing its cross-sectional
implications versus estate data, rich lists and other survey and administrative datasets. I
find it effectively represents the top of the distribution and here, I provide a short summary
of relevant cross-sectional findings from the WAS concerning the wealthy and a brief recall
of key mobility features used in my modelling and estimation.
Throughout this chapter, the benchmark definition of ‘wealth’ is that used earlier -
the sum of private business values; financial assets (cash, shares, bonds, investment funds,
savings products, deposits minus debts and credit cards); property (value minus mortgage
debt) and physical wealth (vehicles, jewellery, collectibles, household contents), minus any
other liabilities.
Table 2.1 shows statistics for the whole population and from wealthy groups4. The
3An example could be Biancotti, D’Alessio and Neri’s [2008] study of the Italian Survey of Household
Income and Wealth
4Income is before taxes and without social benefits, other income categories are investments, rental
properties, pensions and other (including irregular items). Earnings includes self-employed or business
earnings paid as wages. Age5, self-employed and business ownership (amongst the self-employed) refer to
the Household Reference person, whilst all other rows are for the entire household. The ‘wealthy’ groups
46
Group All top 10% top 5% top1%
Age 54 62 61 60
Income 38732 91138 120262 228355
Earnings 31883 60866 79532 146140
Self-employed 0.09 0.21 0.27 0.4
Business owner 0.05 0.15 0.2 0.34
Wealth (total) 317572 1596584 2396994 6355747
Property / Total 0.55 0.48 0.44 0.31
Financial (net) / Total 0.18 0.22 0.22 0.19
Physical / Total 0.15 0.07 0.06 0.03
Business / Total 0.12 0.22 0.28 0.46
Table 2.1: Means for top groups and population
heads of households (‘household reference person’) in top wealth groups are a little older
than those of the general population6. Unsurprisingly, the wealthy have much higher gross
incomes than the population, and a lower proportion of income from earnings (and thus
proportionately higher income from investments and assets). They are much more likely to
be headed by an entrepreneur or business owner and whilst they still concentrate a large
proportion of their wealth in housing, the prominence of business wealth and financial
wealth is much greater amongst the very wealthy.
The ‘average’ wealthy household is quite varied - some households are dominated by
business wealth, others by property. There is great variation in their incomes versus their
wealth and the sources of their incomes. As expressed in the previous chapter, there
is significant mobility between different wealth groups, with large proportions exiting
categories of the wealthiest. It is also important to recall two other features - the large
variation in wealth changes, even (especially) amongst those at the top, and the strong
persistence in continued membership of top wealth categories, despite the relatively high
group exit rates from wave to wave, or ‘stayers stay’ pattern. In Table 2.2 (which repeats
earlier tables for convenience) the probability of staying is highly conditional on history of
membership. Those with longer past membership appear to have a much higher probability
of remaining in the group, whereas new entrants have a very high chance of exit - ‘stayers
stay’7.
are defined by the wealth variable, which is as described in the text. The proportions are dividing one
average by another.
6The age of Head of Households is structurally higher than that of the population of individuals. The
WAS distribution of individual ages matches other demographic data perfectly.
7As mentioned, ELSA data contains similar findings and the high wealth mobility is not dissimilar from
the SCF or PSID.
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top 10% top 5% top 1%
P (T4|F1F2T3) 0.48 0.39 0.30
P (T4|F1T2T3) 0.75 0.68 0.66
P (T4|T1T2T3) 0.91 0.88 0.87
Table 2.2: Probability of remaining in top wealth groups given different histories. ‘Tt’
indicates ‘True’ for belonging to the group in wave t and ‘Ft’ indicates ‘False’ for the
same.
2.3 Model
I now consider incomplete markets explanations for the highly skewed wealth distri-
bution versus the dynamic facts in the WAS data.
The basic structure for the following is an Aiyagari model containing a distribution
of agents deciding to save or consume a simple, liquid asset and facing labour earnings
shocks. It is well known that this model cannot replicate the substantial cross-sectional
wealth inequality in the data, hence I add the different inequality generating mechanisms
discussed in the Introduction.
Households have CRRA utility,
u(c) =
c1−γ
1− γ
In the model, a household can be young or old, with probabilistic ageing and prob-
abilistic death for the old (who are then reborn as young, subject to estate taxes). The
probabilities are selected to replicate actuarial population statistics. I denote the age
status as O and its transitions as ΠO.
They also have (discretised) earnings ability z, which follows a transition matrix Πz and
returns ability R which follows transitions Πz. Similarly, discount factors β are stochastic
and follow transitions Πβ. The age, discount factor, earnings and returns transition matri-
ces are exogenous. They choose to save or consume c in an asset a, creating a state vector
of {(at, zt, Rt, Ot, βt} describing an agent in a given period. The agent aims to maximise
their sum of expected discounted utility, forming the following Bellman equation,
V (at, zt, Rt, Ot, βt) =
max
ct,at+1
{u(ct) + βtEt(V (at+1, zt+1, Rt+1, Ot+1, βt+1))}
The budget constraint for a young agent (Ot = young) is
ct + at+1 = wzt +Rt(1 + r)at
They choose to save or consume out of their earnings income wzt, where w is the
equilibrium wage, and wealth at subject to interest and capital gains earnings Rtrat, r
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being the equilibrium interest rate on the asset.
For the old (Ot = old) the budget constraint is
ct + at+1 = pt +Rt(1 + r)at
This is the same as young agents, except for receipt of a fixed pension p rather than
earnings, which the government pays for using income and consumption taxes.8 I do not
show the taxes in this exposition for clarity and brevity.9
For agents who die and are replaced by a young descendent (Ot = born), the equation
is equivalent to the young but their assets are subject to estate tax τestate,
ct + at+1 = wzt +Rt(1 + r)at(1− τestate(at))
Later in this paper, I characterise and use the processes R, z and β in order to match
wealth inequality. I allow for the possibility of stochastic inheritance of discount factors
after death transitions, but impose full inheritance of R and a redraw of earnings from the
stationary distribution.
To close the model, I have a production sector with a representative firm who produces
a consumable output good using capital and labour. The firm is Cobb-Douglas with capital
share α = 0.33 and pays depreciation of δ = 0.07 on capital. The firm pays r to rent capital
and w to pay workers. I find an equilibrium r which matches capital demand and holdings
among agents.
As the agents are receiving different returns for assets, I create a zero-cost, risk-neutral
and perfectly competitive representative financial intermediary who holds household assets
on their behalf. The intermediary rents the capital to firms, receives the rental income and
return of the capital and then pays a stochastic return to each household on their units
of capital, which is such that on average the intermediary makes zero profit. I assume
this return is (1 + r)R where R stochastic and can be viewed as random efficiency of
the intermediary for each individual household. Households have to hold this asset or
consume. Effectively, this intermediary amalgamates the capital stock for the firm and
then distributes the total returns so that households receive different returns. In reality,
we may prefer to think of this as household ‘ability’ rather than financial intermediary
efficiency/success.
This is a stationary rational expectations equilibrium, with prices and policies:
• HH policy function at+1(at, zt, Rt, Ot, βt) from solving value function problem above
8the tax revenue always exceeds these payments. I assume the remainder is spent on non-utility-
enhancing projects rather than rebated to households for a balanced budget.
9The estate tax is calibrated in the style of Cagetti and Nardi [2006] and Cagetti and Nardi [2004]
by matching proportion of deceased paying (3.5%) and generating a flat effective tax rate by matching
revenue (0.18% of GDP) due to widespread avoidance and tax relief versus headline rates. I use a Gouveia
and Strauss [1994] income tax function estimated for UK taxes, and a UK consumption tax of 17.5%.
Simplified state pension payments follow the ratio of state pensions to earnings in the WAS data.
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given w and r
• the competitive intermediary makes zero profit
• Firm maximises profit KαN1−α − wN − (r + δ)K with factor prices r = MPK − δ
and w = MPN
• markets clear when firm capital demand equals household supply, weighted by their
returns K =
∫
Riaidi
• labour market clears, ∫ nidi = ∫ ziI(Oi = 0)di = N
To operationalise this model, throughout I use a log AR1 distribution of earnings y
for agents10, calibrated to the UK earnings Gini and the Shorrocks Index for Quintiles.
I use WAS figures, as administrative earnings data reported by De Nardi, Fella and Paz
Pardo [2018] has very similar results. Other parameters take well-known values - unless
otherwise specified, there is a discount factor of β = 0.95 and CRRA preferences with
parameter γ = 2 for all agents.
The next step is to add the three wealth inequality generating mechanisms - superstar
earnings, returns heterogeneity and discount factor heterogeneity.
Superstar earnings are in the form of an extra z earnings state with a level Y , which
can be entered into equally from any earnings state (PY,in) and exits equally into any
earnings state (PY,out). This is a modified version of the Castaneda et al-style super-high
ability level y¯ used to generate wealth inequality (“CDR model”).
Individual returns R are characterised as a discretised log-normal AR1 process, with
parameters of autocorrelation ρr and standard deviation σr and a mean of 1. I use this
process to nest the ideas in Benhabib, Bisin & Luo [2015] (“BBL model”) and Benhabib,
Bisin and Zhu [2014] (“BBZ model”) that heterogeneous returns with different persistences
(BBL is lifelong R whilst BBZ has zero autocorrelation) can generate tail wealth inequality
in line with the data - one of my aims is to shed light on the appropriate persistence.
Discount factors β follow the literature11 in assuming a discrete state symmetric pro-
cess. I use two states βl, βh and probability of transition Pβ. I assume that earnings
ability is not inherited and is redrawn from the stationary distribution after death, whilst
returns status is fully inherited12 and I allow stochastic inheritance of β, so there is a
parameter Pβ,d which governs the probabilistic inheritance of β.
2.3.1 Estimation
With the model complete, I now turn to the estimation procedure for recovering pa-
rameters, understanding the mechanisms and comparing to the data. After calculating an
10I am mostly concerned with the upper tail which, as De Nardi, Fella and Paz Pardo [2016] note, even
realistic non-parametric earnings processes do not match, so I keep earnings simple.
11Examples include Krusell and Smith [1998] , Hendricks [2004] and Carroll et al. [2017a].
12As the portfolio, its managers and so on would be inherited, etc.
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equilibrium I simulate 100,000 agents. In summary, I calculate the same moments, tran-
sition matrices and quantile regressions from the model as the WAS data shown earlier
and compare the two using a Simulated Methods of Moments structure. To estimate and
generate the distribution of parameters in the structural model I construct an objective
function based on the model’s moments equally weighted, normalised deviations from a
set of equivalent data moments. I then use a methodology based upon Chernozhukov and
Hong [2003]. I use a Monte Carlo Markov Chain approach, starting from a point in the
parameter space, iteratively applying an innovation to a set of parameters, simulating the
model for a given set of parameters, considering the new value of the objective function,
deciding to accept or reject the new position based on a probabilistic rule and then draw-
ing a new innovation to create new parameters to add to that position and so on. I use
the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, and calibrate such that the acceptance rate is approx-
imately 20%. I discard initial points as a burn-in before calculating the distribution of
parameters.
Throughout, I include time-varying i.i.d. measurement error standard deviation as a
parameter in the estimation. I view this inclusion as best practise in using survey data
and a straightforward correction for which I consider robustness checks. The measurement
error is in logs and identification of measurement error versus returns heterogeneity centres
on the use of conditional transition probabilities as targets. The log specification and i.i.d.
draws create negative autocorrelation which influences the ‘stayers stay’ pattern and so
identifies the variance parameter, together with pressure from the moment of total variance
of observed changes in log wealth.
The data moments, or targets, are:
• top 1, 5 and 10% wealth shares
• 2, 4, 6 and 8 year top wealth staying rates for top 10%, 5% and 1%
• 2-stage (e.g. T |FT in my notation) and 3-stage (e.g. T |FFT ) conditional staying
rates for top 1 and 5%
• standard deviation of changes in log wealth above median wealth (0.32)
• UK Capital-Income ratio (2.5)
There are 23 targets in total, shown in Table 2.3 and I also provide the full list of
targets and their data values when discussing and comparing versus results in Table 2.16.
The total parameter count from the above is 10, leaving 13 degrees of freedom for the
joint estimation and thus being overidentified.
The data targets are estimated from the WAS, in the manner described earlier in this
work and using the same notation. Thus P (T |FT ) refers to the probability that someone
will be a member of a category, given that they have been a member of the category (T)
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Moment Definition Targeted Value
Share of wealth held by Top 1% 0.206
Share of wealth held by Top 5% 0.385
Share of wealth held by Top 10% 0.478
Probability of staying in top 1% (2yr) 0.73
Probability of staying in top 5% (2yr) 0.67
Top 1% P (T |FT ) 0.37
Top 1% P (T |TT ) 0.81
Top 5% P (T |FT ) 0.44
Top 5% P (T |TT ) 0.87
Top 1% P (T |FFT ) 0.3
Top 5% P (T |FFT ) 0.39
Top 1% P (T |TTT ) 0.87
Top 5% P (T |TTT ) 0.88
Probability of staying in top 1% (4yr) 0.59
Probability of staying in top 1% (6yr) 0.55
Probability of staying in top 1% (8yr) 0.51
Probability of staying in top 5% (4yr) 0.68
Probability of staying in top 5% (6yr) 0.63
Probability of staying in top 5% (8yr) 0.61
Probability of staying in top 10% (4yr) 0.71
Probability of staying in top 10% (6yr) 0.68
Probability of staying in top 10% (8yr) 0.63
σ∆log(wealth) (above median only) 0.34
Capital:Income Ratio 2.5
Table 2.3: Estimation Moments.
only for one period, before which they were not in the category (F). I use both two-stage
and three-stage conditional probabilities in this estimation, though I exclude P (T |FTT )
given that the other two- and three-stage moments together with the overall probability
of staying make this predictable and thus a possible source of collinearity. I only include
those above median wealth in the standard deviation moment, as those at the bottom are
dominated by the (simple AR1) earnings process. The lower end of the wealth distribution
is not my focus and this model does not aim to explain it with great accuracy, so I use
those above the median. The capital income ratio for the UK is somewhat lower than the
US at 2.5, although it varies over the relevant period (a decade or so) between 2.4 and
2.6, so I take the average.
In the most general model I use, which incorporates all three mechanisms, the 10
parameters from the model are displayed in Table 2.4.
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Definition Parameter
R autocorrelation ρr
R standard deviation σr
superstar level Y
superstar entry probability PY,in
superstar exit probability PY,in
probability of staying in β state Pβ
β inheritance probability Pβ,d
first β state βl
second β state βh
measurement error standard deviation σv
Table 2.4: Parameters for estimation.
2.4 Results
The main result is that heterogeneous returns to wealth fits the data best amongst
the three mechanisms. I consider estimations using each theory on its own and then a
joint estimation with mechanisms from all three theories in Table 2.5. The sum of squared
errors (SSE) from the data moments finds R shocks superior to the other two mechanisms
on this fit index and quite close to the errors of the unconstrained estimation involving
all three explanations. This method of comparison mirrors the equally-weighted GMM
objective function used for all the estimations.13 The parameters for the R process are
very similar between the estimation using R alone and the multiple explanation version - an
autocorrelation of 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.1. The multiple explanation estimation
has superstars with very low earnings versus the canonical extraordinary levels used (only
4x median earnings) and limited β heterogeneity, suggesting returns heterogeneity remains
the driver behind inequality even when other mechanisms are allowed.
Measure Model Min. Median Mean
Sum Squared Error All mechanisms 0.09 0.14 0.16
R only 0.12 0.26 0.38
Superstars 0.42 0.94 0.89
β only 0.7 0.9 0.89
Table 2.5: Fit of estimations.
In table 2.5, the minimum sum of squared errors represents the best fit of the particular
model, which is particularly close between R only and all mechanisms. The mean and
median are draw from the distribution of results for each model. In terms of minimum,
mean or median SSE, Superstars are a much poorer fit than R shocks or the unconstrained
estimation, and are very similar to β only. As would be expected, the unconstrained
mechanism does improve over R shocks alone, but by significantly less.
The reason for the identification of returns heterogeneity as the best theory to explain
the data comes from the tension between inequality and mobility across the different the-
13‘moment condition’ is used interchangeably with ‘target’ throughout this chapter.
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ories. With the exception of wealth returns variance, the mechanisms to create inequality
rely on incentivising persistent above average saving over time in a subset of the popula-
tion and thus generating a wealthy group. But this (almost necessarily) generates stasis
in wealth. The mobility moments force the model to generate wealthy households who
lose wealth rapidly enough to exit wealthy groups at the correct rates and in the right
time-frame, providing tension against allowing this stasis. Whilst time-varying measure-
ment error can increase mobility, it is particularly restricted on the upside by the need to
match the standard deviation of wealth.
Wealth returns heterogeneity can cause the rapid changes in wealth found in the data
due to both directly affecting the stock of wealth and changing incentives to save in the
future. It can do so whilst also creating inequality at realistic levels. This is particularly
important for matching downward changes in wealth, as Superstars lose high income but
only consume their wealth stock gradually to smooth consumption, whilst β shocks focus
on savings incentives alone and are very persistent to generate inequality. Whilst both
of the two other mechanisms can attempt to match mobility, they do so either with the
aid of excessive measurement error volatility, which causes the model to overshoot wealth
variability (σ∆log(w)) or, as realistic inequality would cause a failure to match mobility,
they choose parameters which generate too little inequality. For example, the top 1%
wealth share for the model with superstars only is 13%, versus 20% in the data. These
large deviations are then punished in the fit index.
As a demonstration of the mechanism by which returns heterogeneity generates rapid
downward changes in Figure 2.1 I examine a a wealthy household at the 99.5 percentile
suffering a series of the worst shocks under each theory. Low heterogeneous returns re-
alisations are in black, a loss of superstar ability in red and a lower discount factor in
orange. I show the points when the agent reaches key quantiles such at the 99th (top 1%)
in text alongside each curve. The very unlucky agent in black continually experiences the
very lowest state of heterogeneous returns R in the discretised AR1 process (-26%) and
has constant median earnings wz. He rapidly falls to below the median wealth in less
than a decade.14 In blue, I show the same agent path, but compensated for the direct
losses of wealth and changes in his budget constraint. This disentangles the mechanisms
of direct changes to wealth from R and changes to savings incentives - discovering the
incentive effect by compensating the agent for the direct loss of wealth but having the
same R state and expectations. The blue agent deaccumulates much more slowly, showing
a large proportion of mobility from R shocks comes from the direct changes, nonetheless,
there is still a significant fall from R expectations alone.
The red superstar agent deaccumulates slowly and from a significantly higher wealth
14Note that this unlucky agent is indeed unlucky given the medium persistence of the R process (ρr =
0.47) and is illustrative. Yet annual falls of -26% are not uncommon in the wealth data earlier or in asset
markets.
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Figure 2.1: Simulation of agents wealth over time, starting at the 99.5th percentile and ex-
periencing very bad shocks in different models. Point at which agent passes key percentile
of wealth shown with text of that percentile next to curves.
position, visually depicting the greater wealth immobility resulting from superstars. This
can be seen in the percentiles the agents pass through - the unlucky R agent is below
the 95th percentile in 3 years, the compensated low R agent reaches the 95th percentile
in 30 years and the superstar agent remains above this. One can thereby see the need
for higher measurement error amongst superstars to create mobility and the constraint
on the superstar mechanism from high mobility leading to inability to match inequality.
The estimated R model depicted in the figure has realistic inequality, yet the estimated
superstar process that would replicate inequality would have even higher wealth.
An agent from the β model is shown in orange. This agent is at the 99.5th percentile
and is given the lower β, in this case 0.935 versus a high β of 0.975. The β model has a
very high persistence (with an estimated average state duration of 2000 years), so having
an agent with such high wealth without a high β is exceedingly rare and not typical of
transitions in the β model, which are mostly attributable to measurement error in the
estimation. The agent deaccumulates quite quickly in absolute terms, but still remains
above the 90th percentile after 25 years. The high persistence of the lower state means
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the agent expects to have a low value for future savings for a very long time and so the
impact of the lower discount factor is magnified by the long future expectation, resulting
in fast wealth stock consumption. The compensated R agent has a gentler slope than the
β agent due to the lower expected persistence of their R state and thus a smaller impact
on their future expected returns and value of savings.
I now turn to the results of estimating each explanation in turn, before covering the
joint estimation of all three mechanisms and robustness checks.
2.4.1 Superstar earnings
Giving a small number of households incredibly high earnings with a significant chance
of losing those earnings generates substantial inequality. These lucky agents are aware of
their eventual superstar-less future and save a substantial proportion of their income to
insure against this, as agents save most of a temporary income shock. When they do lose
their superstar ability, they then dis-save gradually, smoothing their consumption over
time according to their discounting preferences.
Although typically the population of superstars used is very small and with extraordi-
nary income (for example, 0.01% in Kindermann and Krueger [2014] earn over 1000 times
median earnings) I allow the entry and exit probabilities for superstars to be estimated
such that different populations with different longevity are possible, as described above.
The superstar earnings process has three parameters: a level Y , a superstar entry prob-
ability PY,in and exit probability PY,out. In addition, there is the standard deviation of
time-varying measurement error σv.
Parameter Mean Q0.05 Q0.5 Q0.95 s.e.
Y 15.409 8.71 14.14 25.43 5.411
Py,in 0.002 0.00112 0.00195 0.00406 0.001
Py,out 0.324 0.13 0.338 0.478 0.096
σv 0.3 0.238 0.296 0.373 0.038
Table 2.6: Estimated parameters
I find the superstar estimates to be have much lower earnings than is usual for such
models, only 10-20 times median, and around 0.6% of the population are superstars. The
model then struggles to match tail inequality with these weak superstars. The estimation
procedure prefers to minimise the earnings of superstars in order to attempt to match
mobility. In table 2.7 the match to conditional mobility moments and staying rates is
good, but the wealth share of the top 1% is significantly too low, as is their staying rate.
This is likely due to the large estimated measurement error volatility. At 0.3, this is almost
as large as total data volatility of wealth (σ∆log(w) targeted moment, 0.34) and causes the
model’s σ∆log(w) to significantly overshoot the target.
Separately calibrating the model to match cross-sectional inequality moments alone,
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Moment Data Mean Q0.05 Q0.5 Q0.95 s.d.
Top 1% share 0.206 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.02
Top 5% share 0.385 0.34 0.28 0.34 0.42 0.031
Top 10% share 0.478 0.48 0.41 0.48 0.56 0.031
Top 5% stay 0.73 0.74 0.69 0.74 0.78 0.013
Top 1% stay 0.67 0.61 0.55 0.61 0.68 0.027
Top 1% P (T |FT ) 0.37 0.39 0.35 0.39 0.44 0.015
Top 1% P (T |TT ) 0.81 0.75 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.02
Top 5% P (T |FT ) 0.44 0.44 0.37 0.44 0.5 0.026
Top 5% P (T |TT ) 0.87 0.84 0.82 0.85 0.88 0.011
σ∆log(w) 0.34 0.44 0.36 0.43 0.53 0.049
Table 2.7: Selected moments from data and estimation.
I find that to match the top 1% wealth share the model needs earnings of around 50
times the median - and this is very different to the estimation including mobility targets,
or to top earners in the administrative earnings and survey data, who are significantly
lower.15 This aligns with criticisms from Benhabib et al. [2015] that superstar models
have to use earnings far above that found in surveys or administrative data when matching
inequality16. These findings show that the high earnings and resultant inequality disappear
when confronted with mobility.
If the model is forced to focus solely on cross-sectional inequality, as mentioned above,
wealth shares can be matched, but only by greater immobility - for example, a biennial
staying rate of 80% for the top 1%. This is because the earnings level needed to match
wealth inequality is so high that agents take a very long time to fall to another category.
In the case of imposing realistic inequality, measurement error would have to be even
greater to match mobility and would further overshoot σ∆log(w). In the estimation, using
measurement error to match mobility is constrained by targeting variance of log changes in
wealth and the ‘stayers stay’ pattern, leaving the superstars mechanism to choose between
matching mobility or inequality.
15‘Real’ superstars’ probabilities of entry and exit for the top earnings 0.1% from the WAS are yearly
equivalents of 0.0002-0.0005 and 0.3-0.4, with similar figures for the top 0.5% and top 1%. They earn
an average of 30 times median household earnings. Results from De Nardi et al. [2018] using the UK
administrative earnings survey dataset are very similar.
16Though the debate on effective capturing of high earners in tax data is still open.
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Figure 2.2: Estimated parameter density distribution.
2.4.2 Discount Factor Heterogeneity
It is difficult to use symmetric preference heterogeneity to generate inequality that
matches the right tail of the wealth distribution, as noted by Hendricks [2004]. I esti-
mate the persistence of discount factors both within lives (Pβ for staying in a β state)
and through inheritance (Pβ,d to keep β state). The two discount factors βl and βh are
parameters estimated within the unit interval.
The estimation results reflect the difficulty of replicating inequality at the very top
with discount factors alone, ending with point-densities at corner solutions where Pβ −→ 1.
As Pβ,d is also very close to 1, the agents have very long preferences - they keep their β
almost certainly for their entire life and only have a one in 40 chance their children will
not have the same discount factor state. Given the expected working life and estimated
probabilities, the average household will stay in the same state for over 2000 years. Despite
the immense longevity and opportuntiy for large differentiation between discount factors,
this only results in a top 1% wealth share of less than 15% and top 5% share of 30%.
Because there are only two symmetric states, too much longevity or differentiation could
decrease tail inequality as the different populations are too big to cause the concentrated
accumulation by a very small group that occurs in the empirical Pareto distribution.
Nonetheless, due to the allowance for measurement error, the longevity of the prefer-
ence dynasties does not result in surface level secular stasis. However, the staying rates are
not well matched, as can be seen in Table 2.9. The pattern of the conditional staying rates
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Parameter Mean Q0.05 Q0.5 Q0.95 s.e.
β1 0.936 0.932 0.937 0.938 0.002
β2 0.976 0.963 0.979 0.984 0.007
Pβ 0.999 0.9993 0.9998 0.9999 0.002
Pβ,d 0.949 0.931 0.952 0.955 0.007
σv 0.218 0.2 0.221 0.234 0.011
Table 2.8: Estimated parameters
is relatively close to the data for the top 1%, but at the cost of not matching staying rates
at different horizons or moments at the top 5% and 10%. However, the poorest match is
that this long discount factor heterogeneity results in a capital income ratio far in excess
of the target (and in excess of other models). Whilst this target could be matched by low-
ering one or both β’s it appears the pressure to match other moments (such as inequality)
prevents this from occurring.
Moment Data Mean Q0.05 Q0.5 Q0.95 s.d.
Top 1% share 0.206 0.13 0.1 0.14 0.15 0.018
Top 1% stay 2yr 0.67 0.74 0.67 0.76 0.79 0.05
Top 1% stay 4yr 0.59 0.74 0.68 0.76 0.79 0.048
Top 1% stay 6yr 0.55 0.74 0.65 0.75 0.78 0.051
Top 1% stay 8yr 0.51 0.73 0.66 0.75 0.78 0.053
Top 1% P (T |FFT ) 0.3 0.27 0.24 0.27 0.3 0.019
Top 5% P (T |FFT ) 0.39 0.32 0.3 0.31 0.34 0.01
σ∆log(w) 0.34 0.32 0.3 0.33 0.35 0.016
K:Y ratio 2.5 3.36 2.87 3.48 3.65 0.293
Table 2.9: Selected moments from data and estimation.
2.4.3 Returns heterogeneity
Returns heterogeneity can generate significant wealth inequality, either through high
persistence of different returns and gradual accumulation or through high variance and
sudden exogenous gains of wealth. It also has the advantage of being able to destroy or
limit a stock of wealth through negative returns, something the other mechanisms lack.
This can, for example, aid a speedy descent for some of the wealthy to help match mobility
data as discussed earlier.
Parameter Mean Q0.05 Q0.5 Q0.95 s.e.
ρr 0.328 0.119 0.328 0.535 0.088
σr 0.131 0.096 0.129 0.174 0.019
σv 0.207 0.172 0.204 0.247 2.022
Table 2.10: Estimated parameters
I estimate (annual) positive autocorrelation of approximately 0.33 and standard devia-
tion of 0.13 for R. There is a trade off between autocorrelation and standard deviation, as
agents need greater variance to gain enough wealth to match inequality when persistence
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of wealth returns is low, as seen in Table 2.11. This leads to negative correlation between
ρr and σr. Unsurprising, in the correlation of parameters, ρr is positively correlated with
measurement error volatility, as higher wealth returns persistence decreases mobility, lead-
ing to a need for measurement error σv to increase variation and mobility to that found
in the data.
ρr σr σv
ρr 1.00 -0.27 0.21
σr -0.27 1.00 0.23
σv 0.21 0.23 1.00
Table 2.11: Correlation of parameters from estimation.
Top 1% (and below) wealth shares are accurately captured, as are conditional mobil-
ity moments. In table 2.12 there is a qualitative match to the data overall in terms of
decreasing staying rates in top categories with greater time horizons, though the top 1%
differentiation over time is not as large in the model as in the data.
One moment not used in the estimation is the general equilibrium interest rate r. This
can be high in these estimations, ranging from 5% up to 10% with some R parameter sets.
Given the significant variance in the single wealth asset it is not surprising that r is above
the usual range that the risk-free market-clearing interest rates in general equilibrium
models lie within.
Moment Data Mean Q0.05 Q0.5 Q0.95 s.d.
Top 1% share 0.206 0.2 0.11 0.2 0.27 0.041
Top 1% stay 2yr 0.67 0.7 0.64 0.7 0.75 0.026
Top 1% stay 4yr 0.59 0.66 0.6 0.66 0.73 0.025
Top 1% stay 6yr 0.55 0.61 0.55 0.61 0.71 0.026
Top 1% stay 8yr 0.51 0.58 0.5 0.58 0.68 0.029
Top 5% stay 2yr 0.73 0.69 0.65 0.69 0.73 0.02
Top 5% stay 4yr 0.68 0.64 0.61 0.64 0.68 0.016
Top 5% stay 6yr 0.63 0.6 0.56 0.6 0.64 0.014
Top 5% stay 8yr 0.61 0.56 0.52 0.56 0.6 0.014
Top 1% P (T |FFT ) 0.3 0.36 0.28 0.35 0.44 0.029
σ∆log(w) 0.34 0.36 0.28 0.36 0.46 0.042
Table 2.12: Selected moments from data and estimation.
The ‘true’ fluctuations in wealth can be observed by studying simulations without the
measurement error input. Examining the staying probabilities for agents with different
histories in Table 2.13, there is a higher staying rate in the underlying structural model,
with around 85% staying. In Table 2.14 the underlying model still demonstrates some of
the ‘stayers stay’ pattern (more so than other estimated models), but is not as mobile as
the previous results and the data.
As explained above, the effects of returns heterogeneity can be broken down into two
major effects: returns affect both income today and saving incentives for tomorrow by
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Source top 10% top 5% top 1%
Data 0.76 0.72 0.65
with ME 0.72 0.69 0.68
underlying 0.86 0.84 0.85
Table 2.13: Probability of remaining in top wealth groups for data and estimated models.
Source History top 10% top 5% top 1%
Data T3|F1T2 0.51 0.37 0.4
Data T3|T1T2 0.88 0.83 0.79
with ME T3|F1T2 0.49 0.45 0.4
with ME T3|T1T2 0.81 0.8 0.82
w/out ME T3|F1T2 0.73 0.73 0.68
w/out ME T3|T1T2 0.88 0.87 0.89
Table 2.14: Probability of remaining in top wealth groups, given different histories for data
and models. ‘Tt’ indicates ‘True’ for belonging to the group in wave t and ‘Ft’ indicates
‘False’ for the same.
realising gains or losses on the stock of wealth and by giving different expectations of
future returns. In the case of exactly zero returns persistence, there is no difference in
expected returns, but for the case of positive autocorrelation, there is an incentive to
make savings decisions correlated with today’s returns, to take advantage of future high
returns by investing or to spend now to avoid the poor returns in the future. Of course,
this ignores the counter-balance of wealth effects - there is a further effect that an agent
who expects to be poorer from a negative wealth change is incentivised to keep saving in
expectation of that potential poverty even though it is the low returns to wealth which
would cause that poverty.17.
These effects are very different to those generated by superstars. Superstar ability only
directly changes the flow of wealth, not the stock. Not only this, but they do not have a
negative flow aspect, and thus find it difficult to create mobility. In contrast, R shocks
scale with wealth, ensuring the wealthy are equally vulnerable, and can result in negative
income. The incentive effects under persistent returns shocks are similar to discount factor
shocks as β changes in future wealth value can be mapped to different future returns, but
the discount factor variation does not include direct changes in the stock of wealth.
17This effect is small for the rich right tail focused upon
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Figure 2.3: Estimated parameter density distribution for R shocks.
2.4.4 Joint Estimation
The parameters in the joint estimation of all three theoretical mechanisms are similar
to the estimation restricted to R heterogeneity alone, with positive autocorrelation in R
of 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.1. Superstars are not very super, with an average
estimate of only 4 times median earnings for a superstar population of the top 0.6%, as
opposed to the approximate 50 time median earnings for the top 0.1% needed to match
inequality solely using superstars. The two levels of discount factors have some deviations
but are extremely short-lived versus the 50 year average duration in Krusell & Smith or the
expected 2000 years in the β only estimation, with agents staying in a state for an average
of 3 years and inheriting the same ability with a roughly 50% chance18. Measurement
error volatility also displays a similar level to that with R shocks alone, with σv close to
0.2.
The model fits key targets, including both wealth shares and staying probabilities - I
show the full estimation results for the joint model and the individual mechanism models
in table 2.16. It is unsurprising that the fit to many targets for the joint estimation is very
similar to that with R shocks alone, given the similarity of parameters.
In table 2.17 I compare the data, model results and underlying fluctuations for staying
rates. Wealth mobility is somewhat lower than wealth surveys, but still very much present.
Similarly, there is still a pattern that new entrants are less likely to stay.
18The same as the symmetric stationary distribution probabilities.
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Parameter Mean Q0.05 Q0.5 Q0.95 s.e.
ρr 0.502 0.308 0.533 0.625 0.088
σr 0.1 0.071 0.097 0.134 0.019
Y 4.341 2.225 3.747 9.781 2.022
PY,enter 0.002 0 0.001 0.005 0.002
PY,exit 0.312 0.03 0.366 0.582 0.191
Pβ,d 0.475 0.122 0.627 0.829 0.261
Pβ 0.678 0.412 0.687 0.957 0.153
βl 0.949 0.894 0.957 0.984 0.029
βh 0.949 0.925 0.942 0.985 0.02
σv 0.232 0.206 0.225 0.275 0.02
Table 2.15: Estimated parameters
Moment Target Joint R β Superstars
Top 1% wealth share 0.21 0.2 0.2 0.13 0.13
Top 5% wealth share 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.31 0.34
Top 10% wealth share 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.48
Prob. stay top 5%, 2yr 0.73 0.7 0.69 0.68 0.74
Prob. stay in top 1%, 2yr 0.67 0.69 0.7 0.74 0.61
Top 1% P (T |FT ) 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.36 0.39
Top 1% P (T |TT ) 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.87 0.75
Top 5% P (T |FT ) 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.4 0.44
Top 5% P (T |TT ) 0.87 0.81 0.8 0.81 0.84
Top 1% P (T |FFT ) 0.3 0.33 0.36 0.27 0.35
Top 5% P (T |FFT ) 0.39 0.4 0.41 0.32 0.39
Top 1% P (T |TTT ) 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.91 0.8
Top 5% P (T |TTT ) 0.88 0.85 0.84 0.87 0.88
Prob. stay in top 1%, 4yr 0.59 0.65 0.66 0.74 0.59
Prob. stay in top 1%, 6yr 0.55 0.62 0.61 0.74 0.56
Prob. stay in top 1%, 8yr 0.51 0.58 0.58 0.73 0.53
Prob. stay in top 5%, 4yr 0.68 0.66 0.64 0.68 0.72
Prob. stay in top 5%, 6yr 0.63 0.62 0.6 0.67 0.7
Prob. stay in top 5%, 8yr 0.61 0.58 0.56 0.66 0.67
Prob. stay in top 10%, 4yr 0.71 0.7 0.68 0.75 0.72
Prob. stay in top 10%, 6yr 0.68 0.66 0.63 0.74 0.7
Prob. stay in top 10%, 8yr 0.63 0.62 0.59 0.73 0.69
σ∆log(wealth) (> Q2) 0.34 0.38 2.46 0.32 0.44
K:Y Ratio 2.5 2.45 0.36 3.36 2.67
Table 2.16: Mean Estimation Moments.
Source top 10% top 5% top 1%
Data 0.77 0.73 0.67
with ME 0.72 0.69 0.69
underlying 0.88 0.87 0.88
Table 2.17: Probability of remaining in top wealth groups for data and estimated models.
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Figure 2.4: Estimated parameter density distribution for joint estimation.
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2.5 Robustness
In this section, I check robustness of these results with two examples: firstly, imple-
menting ‘real superstars’ - taking high earnings from the data and using their earnings
levels and dynamics to fit the superstar earnings process whilst estimating the other pa-
rameters. Secondly, restricting measurement error to be a ratio to variation in wealth,
based on findings from a measurement error identification exercise in the previous chap-
ter.
2.5.1 Real Superstars
One simple way to test the robustness of the estimation is to consider changing the
earnings process - high earners can be identified in the WAS dataset and in administrative
data, as mentioned earlier, so information can be used to implement realistic superstar
earnings. From this, I can examine whether my results from the main estimation continue
to hold, or does the prominence of returns heterogeneity wither when faced with high
earnings from the data?
I implement superstars based on earnings of the top 0.1% and re-estimate the remaining
discount factor heterogeneity and wealth returns parameters. Using the WAS and the
administrative earnings data (De Nardi et al. [2016]), the top 0.1% of earners have a
yearly transition probability of 0.0004 into this category and 0.4 out of it, with an average
earnings of about 30 times the median (which, as mentioned earlier, is approximately
half the level needed to match cross-sectional inequality). I note the earnings transition
probabilities of the top 0.1% are similar to the top 1%, 0.5% and 0.01%.
Parameter Mean Q0.05 Q0.5 Q0.95 s.e.
ρr 0.478 0.241 0.482 0.702 0.131
σr 0.129 0.084 0.127 0.182 0.024
Pβ 0.225 0.083 0.247 0.351 0.079
Pβ,d 0.565 0.452 0.546 0.783 0.093
βl 0.97 0.949 0.971 0.988 0.011
βh 0.969 0.944 0.97 0.987 0.012
σv 0.277 0.236 0.275 0.332 0.027
Table 2.18: Estimated parameters
I find similar results to the earlier joint estimation, though the variation of wealth
returns is higher to compensate for the lower mobility the data-superstars cause19. In line
with this reasoning, σr is somewhat higher. Discount factor persistence is very low, with
an average duration of less than 2 years. There are some differences between the two β’s
despite similar mean levels. This short duration β variation is also likely to stem from
19As the joint estimation is allowed to have very low earning superstars, there is less pressure towards
immobility.
65
pressure to mitigate immobility caused by superstars. Superstar-sourced immobility can
also explains the need for higher measurement error variation.
Moment Data Mean Q0.05 Q0.5 Q0.95 s.d.
Top 1% share 0.206 0.2 0.165 0.196 0.242 0.019
Top 5% share 0.385 0.371 0.327 0.366 0.429 0.024
Top 10% share 0.478 0.491 0.446 0.488 0.549 0.024
Top 5% stay 0.73 0.691 0.652 0.689 0.74 0.021
Top 1% stay 0.67 0.724 0.681 0.723 0.767 0.021
Top 1% P (T |FT ) 0.37 0.449 0.396 0.451 0.5 0.017
Top 1% P (T |TT ) 0.81 0.827 0.796 0.827 0.861 0.013
Top 5% P (T |FT ) 0.44 0.435 0.387 0.434 0.479 0.018
Top 5% P (T |TT ) 0.87 0.807 0.781 0.807 0.832 0.013
σ∆log(w) 0.34 0.444 0.385 0.439 0.517 0.036
K:Y ratio 2.5 2.772 2.462 2.762 3.066 0.136
Table 2.19: Selected moments from data and estimation.
The fit to the wealth and mobility targets is similar, as would be expected. However,
wealth variance and K:Y ratio are too large (rather like the results from superstars alone).
The pattern of higher staying rates at the top 1% versus the top 5% is in conflict with
the data. Otherwise, the overall conclusion is that the qualitative and major quantita-
tive results from earlier parts are not largely affected by direct use of earnings data for
superstars.
2.5.2 Proportionally Restricted Measurement Error
As an alternative benchmark to directly fitting measurement error, I utilise the pro-
cedure of Lee et al. [2017] to identify the size of i.i.d. time-varying measurement error
variance in the WAS in the earlier chapter. Using an AR1 dynamic panel instrumental
variable GMM estimation in the style of Arellano and Bond [1991], I found the measure-
ment error standard deviation to be half that of ‘true’ equation error standard deviation,
suggesting it has a quantitatively significant presence, but does not dominate. I now use
this ratio of estimated measurement error standard deviation to total standard deviation of
changes in log wealth to generate the size of measurement error for a given model output,
i.e. using the model-generated wealth volatility to anchor a proportional measurement er-
ror variance (“every unit of wealth variance has x units of measurement error variance”).
Under this restriction, I add a proportionally fixed amount of measurement error to the
model output each time, rather than allowing σv to fluctuate and using a target of wealth
variation and other dynamics to identify it.
I use a minimiser in each estimation iteration to find a σv that creates an output wealth
process with a 1:2 ratio of σv : σ∆log(w).
Comparing to the joint estimation, positive wealth returns autocorrelation is stronger,
near to 0.8 rather than 0.5 and standard deviation is correspondingly lower (as it has to
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decrease with higher autocorrelation to have similar inequality). Superstar earnings are no
longer extremely low and instead around 17x median earnings, which is close to the data
level for the top 0.5%, though with higher exit. Discount factor heterogeneity is larger,
but similarly (im)persistent.
Parameter Mean Q0.05 Q0.5 Q0.95 s.d.
ρr 0.722 0.4 0.756 0.936 0.149
σr 0.07 0.036 0.067 0.118 0.021
Y 13.074 2.745 15.806 20.39 6.221
PY,enter 0.002 0 0.002 0.004 0.001
PY,exit 0.728 0.557 0.756 0.848 0.086
Pβ,d 0.772 0.634 0.775 0.92 0.081
Pβ 0.566 0.368 0.564 0.753 0.121
βl 0.952 0.918 0.951 0.98 0.016
βh 0.961 0.918 0.965 0.993 0.023
Table 2.20: Estimated parameters
I show the match to the data for proportional measurement error and real superstars
versus the main joint estimation and the data in Table 2.21. The inequality and mobil-
ity moments are better matched under proportional measurement error, at the cost of
excessive wealth variation at 0.47. In particular, the probabilities of staying in different
groups over different horizons are very well matched. Without variance of changes in log
wealth as a target, the generated value of σv causes excessive variance of changes in log
wealth. With greater measurement error, the wealth-inequality-generating theories have
less pressure to generate mobility. I do not target the wealth variance in this exercise as
that would push σv to take a specific value like the other estimations rather than simply
respond proportionally to the variation in wealth generated by the mechanisms.
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Moment Target Joint Restricted M.E. Real Superstars
Top 1% wealth share 0.21 0.2 0.21 0.2
Top 5% wealth share 0.38 0.36 0.4 0.37
Top 10% wealth share 0.48 0.48 0.53 0.49
Prob. stay top 5%, 2yr 0.73 0.7 0.69 0.69
Prob. stay in top 1% (2yr) 0.67 0.69 0.65 0.72
Top 1% P (T |FT ) 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.45
Top 1% P (T |TT ) 0.81 0.82 0.8 0.83
Top 5% P (T |FT ) 0.44 0.45 0.43 0.43
Top 5% P (T |TT ) 0.87 0.81 0.81 0.81
Top 1% P (T |FFT ) 0.3 0.33 0.32 0.42
Top 5% P (T |FFT ) 0.39 0.4 0.39 0.4
Top 1% P (T |TTT ) 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.86
Top 5% P (T |TTT ) 0.88 0.85 0.85 0.85
Prob. stay in top 1%, 4yr 0.59 0.65 0.62 0.67
Prob. stay in top 1%, 6yr 0.55 0.62 0.58 0.62
Prob. stay in top 1%, 8yr 0.51 0.58 0.55 0.58
Prob. stay in top 5%, 4yr 0.68 0.66 0.65 0.64
Prob. stay in top 5%, 6yr 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.6
Prob. stay in top 5%, 8yr 0.61 0.58 0.58 0.56
Prob. stay in top 10%, 4yr 0.71 0.7 0.69 0.66
Prob. stay in top 10%, 6yr 0.68 0.66 0.65 0.62
Prob. stay in top 10%, 8yr 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.58
σ∆log(wealth) (> Q2) 0.34 0.38 2.6 0.44
K:Y Ratio 2.5 2.45 0.47 2.77
Table 2.21: Mean Estimation Moments.
2.6 Conclusions
My conclusion is that by using transitions in top wealth groups I can identify exogenous
wealth returns heterogeneity as the wealth accumulation mechanism that best explains
the inequality and mobility data. I find that discount factor heterogeneity and superstar
earnings cannot match inequality and mobility simultaneously on their own. When the
three theories are combined in a joint estimation, I find returns heterogeneity dominates.
I explain these results through the ability of returns heterogeneity to account for higher
mobility due to affecting wealth via two mechanisms - direct changes to the stock of
wealth/budget constraints and changes to savings incentives via different expected future
returns. This can create the fast wealth losses we see in the data.
I use a number of facts about fluctuations in wealth amongst the wealthy from the
longitudinal and representative WAS wealth dataset in an estimation of theories generat-
ing wealth inequality. My modelling matches these patterns and demonstrates how such
data is useful for identifying different processes behind wealth inequality. By identifying
the mechanisms generating wealth inequality and mobility in a clear methodology and
explaining why they fit the data, I hope to contribute to better modelling of the real pro-
cesses governing the wealth distribution. The results make clear that any process hoping
to be realistic and match mobility must have a direct impact on both the budget constraint
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and change savings incentives to generate the rapid (downwards) changes in wealth in the
data.
This chapter suggests that when considering the wealth distribution, study into how
and why these differential returns come about and their impact is of greater importance
that studying earnings. For development, these models do not explicitly consider en-
trepreneurship, nor portfolios or risk preferences which would be natural routes to follow,
given the importance of wealth returns I find and this data has the potential to be infor-
mative about this.
69
Chapter 3
Entrepreneurs, Turbulence and
Inequality Dynamics - Who Has
Wealth Matters.
This chapter quantitatively studies the recessionary effects of firm-level productiv-
ity dispersion on credit-constrained entrepreneurs through capital misallocation. It links
business fluctuations and turbulence during recessions to dynamics of personal wealth and
inequality through a heterogeneous model of entrepreneurship and aggregate shocks. In
firm-level data, there is greater mobility and a wider distribution of turnover changes dur-
ing recessions, so I calibrate aggregate shocks to entrepreneurial productivity transitions
and add to a heterogeneous Cagetti-De Nardi model. The increases in turbulence cause
quantitatively substantive and persistent negative responses of capital, consumption and
output. Propagation occurs through increases in capital misallocation under turbulence.
This is due to credit constraints with endogenously greater impact on less productive or
smaller entrepreneurial firms: newly productive firms are unable to fully utilise upward
productivity gains whilst previously productive large firms remain holding inefficiently
large capital stocks. The transmission of these effects are somewhat counter-balanced
by the response of unconstrained corporate firms. Negative shocks to productivity levels
for all producers cause a large reaction and slow recovery from the entrepreneurial sector
which dominates the economy’s response, amplifying the initial shock.
3.1 Introduction
This chapter makes three main contributions to the literature: developing a heteroge-
neous general equilibrium model with aggregate shocks that matches and explains features
of wealth inequality, business trends and business cycles; utilising a new type of distribu-
tional entrepreneurial shock that affects aggregates through micro-changes and discussing
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the role of entrepreneurial constraints over the business cycle.
Entrepreneurs form a large part of the wealthiest in advanced economies (40%+ of
the U.S. or U.K. top 1%1) and hold a large part of their wealth in their businesses. The
framework of Quadrini [2000], Cagetti and Nardi [2006] and Cagetti and Nardi [2006] uses
credit-constrained entrepreneurs to generate realistic wealth inequality, through a reliance
on personal wealth to collateralise business borrowing. This is justified by the empirical
dominance of business owners, entrepreneurs and the self-employed at upper wealth quan-
tiles and their relatively undiversified asset portfolios. The modelling of entrepreneurs has
implications for tax policy in Cagetti and Nardi [2004] and Kitao [2008] whilst Bassetto
et al. [2015] examine the impact of rising financial intermediation costs. Further exam-
ples are bankrupcty in Meh and Terajima [2008] and incorporation decisions in Short and
Glover [2011].
I incorporate aggregate shocks into this framework and solve with a Krusell-Smith
methodology (Krusell and Smith Jr. [1998]), examining total factor productivity (TFP)
shocks for constrained entrepreneurial firms as well as uncertainty shocks to stochastic,
idiosyncratic entrepreneurial productivity transitions, which I call ‘turbulence shocks’.
These shocks increase the probability of changes in productivity for entrepreneurs and
are similar to those in the work of Bloom and others, for example Bloom et al. [2016],
Bloom et al. [2018] and Bloom [2014]. These works use time varying higher moments of
stochastic shock processes, typically for a heterogeneous distribution of firms and study
the effects of changes in uncertainty. In this case, aggregate shocks increase the dispersion
of entrepreneurial productivity transitions and are motivated by patterns of greater reces-
sionary dispersion observed in longitudinal firm data. There is also supporting evidence
in observations from the Wealth and Assets Survey that the probability of transition out
of top income and wealth groups increases in recessions, as also found in Guvenen et al.
[2014b], Guvenen et al. [2014a] and Auten et al. [2013].
Entrepreneurs and workers are aware of the likelihood of state changes, aggregate
shocks and resultant turbulence, which they incorporate into decision making. The trans-
mission mechanism from a turbulent shock is the unequal effects of productivity shocks
on different entrepreneurs. Some rich and productive entrepreneurs fall to a relatively
unproductive firm status (which also has a higher chance of exit). This imposes a tighter
borrowing constraint on them, as borrowing is positively dependent on the creditor-seizable
output of the firm, which is correlated with productivity. Thus, these previously highly
productive entrepreneurs experience a drop in income which prevents their building of
wealth to expand their firm borrowing constraint. Further, if they exit, their capital be-
comes very unproductive, earning only the risk-free rate for lenders. Those benefiting
from a positive shock are constrained by their available capital and so must increase their
1Based on the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances and U.K. Wealth and Assets Survey
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wealth and personal firm size slowly. Simply put, constraints ensure there is no easy way
to redistribute capital from previously productive entrepreneurs to newly productive ones.
hence, greater mobiltiy in productivity creates more allocation problems.
This leads to lower output (as entrepreneurs borrow, employ and produce less), lower
consumption and also lower inequality, after a very brief initial period of increased precau-
tionary saving. Inequality in income and wealth reduces as entrepreneurs dominate the
top of the distribution and are, as a group, poorer. In aggregate, there is a move of both
capital and labour from more to less productive usage, whilst individuals simultaneously
reduce savings through normal self-insurance motives.
However, if the turbulence shock increases variance symmetrically, there is a post-dip
boom as the higher density of entrepreneurs with improved productivity from the shock
begin to build capital and expand their borrowing constraints over time. This mechanism
can also be considered alongside the concept of a ‘financial accelerator’ in Bernanke et al.
[1999]. They propose that positive productivity shocks can incite a virtuous cycle of greater
profits, expansion of entrepreneur-level capital constraints due to increased entrepreneurial
assets to leverage upon and further profits. I find a similar effect (although I focus on
the negative, inverse side of the mechanism), whereby there is a persistent response of the
economy to changes in individual entrepreneurial productivity.
In many ways, this approach is closest to that of Khan and Thomas [2013], who study
the effect of TFP and credit shocks on credit-constrained firms. Their framework is mo-
tivated by aggregate expansion and contraction of firm borrowing for (partly irreversible)
investment. They find the distribution of capital amongst heterogeneous firms interacts
with borrowing shocks to cause contractions in output and other aggregates. Like Khan
and Thomas, I examine the implications of non-optimal capital allocation after shocks
and the inability of agents to redistribute effectively. However, my innovation is the
combination of the heterogeneous entrepreneurial household framework with endogenous
borrowing constraints and aggregate shocks that also change the probability distribution
of entrepreneurial productivity.
The findings are also close to Moll [2014] regarding the persistence of entrepreneurial
ability and the ability of entrepreneurs to self-finance. Moll finds persistence of en-
trepreneurial ability engenders less steady state capital misallocation due to a greater
ability to self-finance entrepreneurial operations. However, it also causes slower transi-
tions between states such that studying steady states alone can be misleading. This result
shows the value of fully implementing aggregate shocks in models of entrepreneurship
and capital constraints. In my work, high turbulence reduces persistence and stability of
entrepreneurial ability and thus, as expected, I find similar results of reduced inequality
and reduced aggregate output, through a similar mechanism. Achdou et al. [2014] use a
continuous time model incorporating standard aggregate TFP shocks and entrepreneurs,
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finding that changes in the wealth distribution are extremely slow. Although the general
framework is similar to this study, turbulence shocks, entrepreneurial heterogeneity and
endogeneity of the borrowing constraint are not.
To examine the distribution of firm-level changes, I use an administrative dataset
containing all active U.K. firms (including small firms and single-person businesses). This
covers 1997 to 2015, and within the series there are recession-associated rises in dispersion
of changes in turnover, as well as a drop in the mean, indicating that the distribution
of outcomes for entrepreneurs widens whilst becoming more negative. I discuss these
changes, and incorporate them into the model.
U.S. data for entrepreneurship and business income has been studied in DeBacker et al.
[2012], who find the distribution of business income has greater spread and much greater
likelihood of extreme values, propelling people rapidly through the income distribution
versus labour income. They also find business income falls as a proportion of overall
income over the Great Recession. Evans and Jovanovic [1989] attempt to structurally
identify the capital constraints for entrepreneurs, finding a value of 1.5x wealth, whilst
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen [2002] provide a study of the relative returns to private
equity and business ownership with surprisingly low private equity returns.
This chapter first describes the model before covering the data for calibration. The
administrative dataset containing all U.K. firms is combined with information from wealth
surveys and time series of macroeconomic aggregates to provide targets for fitting the
model. Then, the impact of different aggregate shocks is discussed and the results are
examined in a series of Impulse Response Functions and simulations before concluding.
3.2 Model Description
I use a general equilibrium Bewley [1977] model where agents face individual shocks and
can partially insure themselves through asset holdings, largely following Cagetti and Nardi
[2006] and Bassetto et al. [2015]. There is a continuum of households of measure one. These
households can use their resources to save in capital or to consume an output/consumption
good. They also make an occupational choice to be a worker or an entrepreneur during
each period, facing both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. If they become a worker,
they inelastically supply an amount of labour, determined by their idiosyncratic (and
stochastic) worker productivity, also known as ‘effective labour’. This strategy (common
in the macroeconomic literature) enables the representation of a distribution of wages with
minimal computational impact. If they have entrepreneurial ability, they may choose to
become an entrepreneur and then select levels of capital and labour to employ in their
firm to maximise their profit. There is also a representative corporate firm, which follows
a standard Cobb-Douglas production function and is designed to reflect the existence of
large, publicly owned firms not facing the same constraints as entrepreneurs and privately
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held businesses. Both types of firm (entrepreneurial and corporate) operate in the same
input/output markets and both are price takers, so pay the same interest rates and wages
and produce the same output good, which households purchase. There is an aggregate
shock which, remaining ambivalent about its exact nature, is included as a state z that
can affect levels of productivity and transitions.
3.2.1 Households
There is a measure one continuum of households. They are infinitely lived and discount
the future, with discount factor β. They aim to maximise utility and have constant relative
risk aversion, so their expected utility function is
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
c1−σt
1− σ .
Et denotes expected value in period t and ct is consumption in t.
Households retire and die probabilistically, following the approach of Cagetti and Nardi
[2006] and Cagetti and Nardi [2004], with an average working life of 45 years, and retire-
ment of 11 years (calibrated to UK statistics). They also pay taxes on their income,
and estate taxes on their wealth when necessary. Retirees cannot work, but can still run
businesses if they have the relevant ability. If not running a business, retirees will be
given a fixed social security income p instead of earnings wy. Throughout the following
exposition, these additional life-cycle elements are ignored to simplify the explanation of
entrepreneurial and worker behaviour.
3.2.2 Technologies
Each agent has some ability y as worker, which reflects the unit of effective labour he
can supply, and some ability θ as entrepreneur.
Entrepreneurial output is given by
f(k, n, θ) = θ(z)(kγ(1 + n)(1−γ))ν .
where k is the entrepreneur’s working capital, n is workers’ labour employed by the
entrepreneur and z is the aggregate state/
Entrepreneurs face decreasing returns from investment (0 < ν < 1) due to the difficulty
of stretching managerial skills across larger projects (“span of control”). Hence, while
entrepreneurial ability is exogenous, an entrepreneur’s return from investing in capital is
an endogenous function of his project’s size.
The entrepreneur uses all of his labour to run the entrepreneurial technology and n is
labour employed in addition to the one unit of the entrepreneur. If the optimal amount
of labour is smaller than 1, the entrepreneur only employs his own unit of labour.
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The real economy is made up of both small entrepreneurial firms and larger corporate
firms, which are unlikely to face entrepreneurial financing restrictions. To represent this,
a corporate production sector is included, which does not face borrowing constraints and
is represented by a standard Cobb-Douglas production function:
F (Kc, Lc) = θ
c(z)Kαc L
1−α
c ,
where Kc, Lc are, respectively, aggregate capital and aggregate labour employed by the
corporate sector. θc is the productivity of the corporate sector, which may be affected by
z. In both sectors capital depreciates at the same rate, δ.
The corporate sector maximises profit at the representative firm, setting prices equal
to marginal products through first order conditions. Since the entrepreneurs and corpo-
rates are competitive, the equilibrium interest rate and wage for period t is given by the
corresponding marginal products in the representative corporate sector, which are
rt = αθ
c(z)
(
Kct
Lct
)α−1
wt = (1− α)θc(z)
(
Kct
Lct
)α
One can rearrange such that wt is a function of rt,
wt = (1− α)θc(z)
(
rt + δ
α
) α
α−1
This represents a no-arbitrage restriction - entrepreneurs wishing to use capital saved
by households must offer to pay the same interest rate as the corporate firms. In equilib-
rium, the result is that the corporate sector is somewhat passive, absorbing labour and
capital supply above the level demanded by entrepreneurial firms. All capital pays r to
savers and all effective labour units are paid w.
While entrepreneurial firms direct their profits to the owner, corporate firms have
constant returns to scale and make zero profit so their ownership and size is not important.
3.2.3 Credit markets
Working capital k = (a + b) in an entrepreneurial business equals the entrepreneur’s
own assets (a) plus or minus assets that are borrowed or lent (b). The method of borrowing
is direct lending of capital, where the entrepreneur agrees to pay the prevailing (corporate)
interest rate on the capital he borrows. This lending is carried out post-shock realisation,
so there is no uncertainty on the returns to these capital loans.
Assume that if the entrepreneur is borrowing and defaults, the creditor seizes a fraction
0 < λ < 1 of output and undepreciated capital after wages are paid. It follows that if the
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entrepreneur wishes to borrow, the amount that the lender is willing to lend is such that
debt and interest on debt are repaid in case of default
(1 + r)(k − a) ≤ λ
(
f(k, n, θ) + (1− δ)k − wn
)
,
which can be written as
k ≤ λ(f(k, n, θ) + (1− δ)k − wn)
(1 + r)
+ a.
The entrepreneur can thus invest an amount k that satisfies the above equation. If the
entrepreneur is not borrowing constrained, the optimal firm size will be implemented and
leftover assets will be invested at the equilibrium interest rate.
Notice that the permitted borrowing, b depends on one’s assets (a), entrepreneurial
ability (θ) and the equilibrium prices (which depend on the aggregate shock.
3.2.4 The basic household decision problem
At the beginning of each period, current ability levels and prices are fully known, whilst
future ones are unknown. Each individual starts a period with assets a, entrepreneurial
ability θ(z) and worker ability y, and chooses whether to be an entrepreneur or a worker
in the current period (a binary indicator, e) and then how much to save for next periods
assets (a′).
Both workers and entrepreneurs supply all their labour (1 unit) inelastically. A worker’s
unit becomes y units in the labour market and the entrepreneur supplies 1 to his project.
Households, whether entrepreneurs or workers, borrow and lend at rate r.
The state variables for the household’s problem are given by the household’s assets
(a), ability levels (y, θ), the aggregate state z and prices r, w (all actors are price takers).
These are the variables the agent takes as given when making his choices. a is endogenous
to households decisions, but y, θ and z are all exogenous and follow transition matrices
Πy, Πθ(z) and Πz. The functional form of θ(z) is defined later - the below applies for
multiple entrepreneurial abilities with any form of underlying transition Πθ(z), which may
be aggregate state dependent.
The infinitely-lived household’s problem can thus be written recursively as:
V (a, y, θ; z, w, r) = max{Ve(a, y, θ; z, w, r), Vw(a, y, θ; z, w, r)}, (3.1)
Ve(a, y, θ; z, w, r) = max
c,k,n,a′
{u(c) + βEt(V (a′, y′, θ′; z′, w′, r′))}. (3.2)
where Ve is the entrepreneur’s value (e=1) and Vw is the worker’s value (e=0). The
expectation of the future value function is taken with respect to (y′, θ′;w′, r′), conditional
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on (y, θ; z, w, r). The maximization process is subject to the following constraints:
f(k, n, θ, z) = θ(z)(kγ(1 + n)(1−γ))ν . (3.3)
c+ a′ = f(k, n, θ, z) + (1− δ)k − wn− (1 + r)(k − a), (3.4)
k ≤ λ(f(k, n, θ, z) + (1− δ)k − wn)
(1 + r)
+ a (3.5)
a ≥ 0, (3.6)
k ≥ 0. (3.7)
3.2.5 The worker’s problem
The worker solves the following problem
Vw(a, y, θ; z, r, w) = max
c,a′
{u(c) + βEtV (a′, y′, θ′; z′, r′, w′)} (3.8)
subject to equation (3.6) and
c+ a′ = (1 + r)a+ w y, (3.9)
where w is the given wage in the state.
3.2.6 The entrepreneur’s problem
If the household has decided to become an entrepreneur, he selects how much capital
and labour to use, as well as how much of the output to save to maximise his value
function, subject to his capital borrowing constraint, current aggregate productivity and
prices.
The first order condition for n from the production function and budget constraint
imply:
1 + n∗(w, z) =
[
w
(1− γ)ν
1
θzηkγν
] 1
(1−γ)ν−1
.
Let
t1 =
−γν
(1− γ)ν − 1; f1 =
[
w
(1− γ)νθ
] 1
(1−γ)ν−1
so,
1 + n = f1 k
t1 (3.10)
This is the optimal n the entrepreneur will choose, given k.
The first order condition for k implies:
k =
[
r + δ
γνθ(1 + n)(1−γ)ν
] 1
γν−1
77
Notice that for 0 < γ < 1 and 0 < ν < 1, n is increasing in k, and k is increasing in n.
Either the entrepreneur wishes to hire n > 0, or he only uses his own labour n = 0. If
the capital borrowing constraint binds, the two relevant equations to use are the capital
borrowing constraint and the first order condition for n. Otherwise, the optimal firm size
applies.
First, the first order condition for n is used to the find the level of k for which n is
equal to zero. I call this k level kbreak
kbreak =
( w
(1− γ)νθzη
) 1
γν
Assuming that the entrepreneur is in the situation where n > 0, then substituting
optimal n as a function of k in the non-linear equation implied by the borrowing constraint:
0 = a− k + λ
1 + r
[
w + (1− δ)k − wf1kt1 + θf1(1−γ)νkγν+t1(1−γ)ν
]
Let us also define an additional f2, f3 and t2,
f2 = λθf1
(1−γ)ν
t2 = γν + t1 (1− γ)ν
f3 = −λw f1
Thus, the (comparatively) simple equation is derived,
0 = a(1 + r) + λw + (λ(1− δ)− (1 + r))k + f3kt3 + f2kt2 (3.11)
which is a non-linear equation in k, given r and w. One can then compare the solution
for k from this equation to kbreak. If k is larger than kbreak then this case is a feasible
solution for k, n. If not, then the case where n = 0 and the entrepreneur only uses his own
labour is considered instead. Then, n = 0 and k solves
0 = a(1 + r) + (λ(1− δ)− (1 + r))k + λθkγν (3.12)
These equations form the two feasible constrained cases - either n > 0 and solve for
k from constraint 3.11 and then use equation 3.10, or if this is infeasible choose n = 0
and solve for k from the borrowing constraint, given n = 0. Checking if the optimal
firm size is achievable and solving the equations above as so if not gives a policy of
{k(a, θ, w, r, z), n(a, θ, w, r, z)} for the entrepreneur and a budget constraint. One can
compare this to the worker value, take the preferred career option, then use value function
iteration to find the savings policy.
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3.2.7 Equilibrium and Algorithm
Equilibrium in this model follows the Krusell-Smith (K-S) definition used in their
equity premium paper (Krusell and Smith Jr. [1997]) and the calculation of r is similar
to the calculation of bond prices in their paper. The recursive definition of equilibrium in
this model is given in a similar2 manner:
First, define Γ as the aggregate state, consisting of the distribution over entrepreneurial
ability, worker productivity, assets and more generally any variable (e.g. prior corporate
capital usage) that influences current or future behaviour. H is the law of motion for the
aggregate state, using transition matrix Πz for productivity transitions,
Γ′ = H(Γ, z, z′)
Next, define policy functions over savings (a′), entrepreneurial capital (k) and labour
(n) and choice to become entrepreneur (e),
a′(a, θ, y, z,Γ)
k(a, θ, y, z,Γ)
n(a, θ, y, z,Γ)
e(a, θ, y, z,Γ), e{0, 1}
Note that k(.) and n(.) are null if θ = 0 since entrepreneurial policy is meaningless
when one has no entrepreneurial ability. Similarly, e = 0 if θ = 0.
Pricing functions r, w are defined as in section 3.2.2.
Together, the law of motion H, the functions a′, k, n, e define an allocation.
Agents (workers, entrepreneurs and firms) optimise according to their problems as
defined in sections 3.2.4, 3.2.5 and 3.2.6 and markets clear, obeying no arbitrage between
different sectors (entrepreneurial and corporate). For labour and capital, market clearing
imposes that individual labour and capital supply sums to aggregate supply and equals
aggregate demand, which itself is summed from individual demand:
∫
i
(1− ei)yidi = L = Lc + Le = Lc +
∫
i
einidi∫
i
a′idi = K = K
c +Ke = Kc +
∫
i
eikidi
The set of allocation, policy functions and pricing functions, together with market
clearing and solution of agents’ problems, defines an equilibrium.
As per K-S, I attempt to find an approximate equilibrium, by suitable definition of Γˆ
2see section 2.2 of Krusell and Smith Jr. [1997], p395.
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which approximates true Γ in the dimensions relevant to the agent’s decisions.
First, one must define a computationally feasible aggregate state Γˆ and laws of motion
Hˆ. In the original K-S (Krusell and Smith Jr. [1998]) there is only one intertemporal
decision, savings in capital, which requires knowledge of future prices. Today’s average
capital and the aggregate shock state are (combined) a good predictor of average capital
tomorrow, and therefore of tomorrow’s prices as there is no production heterogeneity or
labour hours margin. K-S use:
ln(Kt+1) = I{z = g}(a0 + a1ln(Kt)) + I{z = b}(b0 + b1ln(Kt))
In this framework there are two sectors, and aggregate capital is invested in the two
sectors. The equilibrium interest rate is given by the marginal product of capital invested
in the corporate sector only, not by the marginal product of total capital. As stated
above, there is a no arbitrage relationship between users of capital - all corporate and
entrepreneurial capital renters accept the same market rate. Notice that to split capital
between entrepreneurs and corporates today agents need to know, at a minimum, prices
today, (meaning the interest rate and the wage) which are endogenous equilibrium objects
that depend on people’s occupational decisions. To approach this in the K-S limited
rationality methodology, recall the equilibrium interest rate and wage for period t is given
by the corresponding marginal products in the corporate sector, rt = MPKct and wt =
MPLct , and that wt is a function of rt and quantities affected by the aggregate state zt, as
per section 3.2.2. As agents know zt, this leaves rt as the only unknown, a function of the
(unknown) corporate K-L ratio. For the household to make savings and entrepreneurial
decisions, they must forecast the interest rate, the wage and the future capital stock.
Thus, if they use an accurate polynomial approximation to rt and Kt+1, this is sufficient
for equilibrium, following Krusell and Smith’s equity pricing paper (Krusell and Smith Jr.
[1997]). To find the equilibrium, these forecasts can be compared to the interest rate and
capital stock resulting from household’s and firm’s behaviour based on the forecasts, and
when the two are sufficiently similar, this is a numerical equilibrium.
The numerical algorithm for solving the entrepreneurial problem, performing value
function iteration, simulating and updating forecast rules has to be extremely robust.
This model has a number of non linearities - occupational choice, hiring decisions and
ability transitions - that make it difficult to solve (quickly).
3.3 Shock Process, Data and Calibration
3.3.1 Shock Process
The shock process is a distributional shock, affecting the idiosyncratic transitions of
entrepreneurs, changing Πθ as well as traditional level shocks to productivity θ(z) and
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θc(z). There are two usual states of z, normal turbulence and high turbulence, which
correspond to non-recession and recessions. There is an exogenous transfer between these
states, for which agents know probabilities, just as they know the structure of Πθ.
Entrepreneurial ability, θ is distributed across the population with most having ability
zero and a constant ‘entry’ probability into a positive process for θi. For entrepreneurs
with positive ability, each period they receive a shock ηi to their ability,
log(θi,t+1) = log(θi,t) + ηi,t
This forms a process similar to the entrepreneurial ‘ladder’ ability process used by
Quadrini [2000] and Kitao [2008], and other processes used by Luttmer [2010] and Luttmer
[2007]. To make the process stationary and usable, the distribution of θ is bounded at
the top and bottom, with the bounds part of the calibration. The lower bound is an
absorbing boundary whilst the upper bound is reflective. Whilst these assumptions can
be changed, it seems unreasonable that firms would ‘bounce’ out of low productivity with
a very high probability in turbulent recessionary times, and having a reflective upper
boundary ensures there is a tail distribution of productivity rather than a mass at the
upper limit.3 I discretise the process by simulating the bounded unit root process to
recover transition probabilities between equally-spaced θ states.
The exit probabilities for entrepreneurial ability (i.e. transitioning from θ > 0 to
θ = 0) are calibrated to match business survival rates, as in the model of Kitao [2008]
with multiple entrepreneurial ability levels and similar to Sedlacek and Sterk [2014]. The
exit function is,
P (θ = 0|θi) = 1e−2θi
Higher ability entrepreneurs face a lower exit probability, but these probabilities do
not vary with the aggregate state - exit only endogenously increases from events shifting
greater numbers of previously high ability entrepreneurs into lower ability categories. Thus
the lowest state intuitively captures a tail of relatively unproductive firms with high exit
likelihood, and the increase in probability of transitioning there is a part of the turbulence
mechanism.
Being as general as possible, the aggregate shock can change θ levels or change the
distribution of η. Raising the variance σ2η would be akin to Bloom-style dispersion shocks
and changing the mean µη would be very similar to reducing the state vector θ with the
exception that agents moving downwards may encounter different exit probabilities. To
accommodate the data and/or findings of Bloom et al. [2016] that dispersion increases are
mostly due to skew changes from expansion in the lower tail of productivity shocks, it is
3Regardless, experiments with different bounds do not change the conclusions.
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possible to change the distribution for η in a variety of ways. To remain simple, I focus on
increasing the variance of the shock η, which creates a greater amount of turbulence and
movement across the ability spectrum. I also show changes to the θ vector as a simple
comparison to canonical TFP level shocks.
The above defines the aggregate-state-dependent transition matrices for entrepreneurs
Πθ(z) and ability vector θ(z).
I note in advance of the results that alternative characterisations of the process pro-
vide similar results as long as there is the important feature that there are multiple en-
trepreneurial productivity levels and increased transition probabilities between levels under
the turbulent state.
3.3.2 Data
There are two main sources of data used for calibration of the model - the U.K. Wealth
and Assets Survey (‘WAS’) and Business Structure Database (‘BSD’). I choose to base
the model upon the U.K. due to favourable qualities of these datasets. The WAS is used
here for moments regarding entrepreneurial transitions, the distribution of wealth and
the wealth of entrepreneurs. Importantly, the WAS shows greater mobility amongst the
wealthy during the 07-09 transition and an increase in entrepreneurial exit and losses of
business wealth.
07-09 09-11 11-13 13-15
% staying in wealthiest 1% 0.54 0.64 0.67 0.71
% entrepreneurs in wealthiest 1% 0.35 0.41 0.43 0.38
% leaving entrepreneurship 0.48 0.35 0.34 0.39
Table 3.1: Wealth and Assets Survey entrepreneurial statistics by years.
The definition of “entrepreneur” used for the data is those that are self-employed and
say that they are one of ‘sole director’, ‘director’ or ‘partner’, or are ‘self-employed in
another way’ and state a business value of over £1000. This excludes a large group of
self-employed who do not own a business and earn relatively little.
The BSD contains employment and turnover information for all firms in the UK for
1997-2015 and provides the link between entrepreneurial household features and the out-
comes for those entrepreneurial enterprises. The moments I use are sourced from my short
note on the database, Pugh [2018a]. There are approximately 2 million active businesses
in a given year and these businesses can be tracked over time. This dataset is different
to many used in the macro literature as it includes and tracks small firms as well as large
and is at enterprise level, rather than establishment level. An enterprise is much closer
to the concept of an entrepreneurial firm than an establishment. There is also some less
complete data at the ‘enterprise group’ level in the BSD, but the vast majority of enter-
prises are the sole member of their enterprise group. The main findings are that during
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a large recession businesses face a wider and more negative distribution of outcomes than
in non-recessionary times, in addition to increases in business exits and falls in entry.
As shown in Figure 3.1, births decrease whilst exits rise during the recessionary period
around 2008 before births recover to their former level while deaths remain elevated. The
rise in entry in 2002-2005 may be partly due to a change in tax incentives encouraging the
self-employed to register as business owners.
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Figure 3.1: Birth and death rates for enterprises. Years with more than 6 months of
OECD recession indicator shaded.
Figure 3.2 depicts the moments of the distribution for equal weighted percentage
changes in turnover4. Equal weighted changes are well-suited due to the high number
of zero values and extreme movements which would make standard percentage changes or
log changes difficult to use. These show a clear change over the 2009 crisis and other re-
cessions. The mean falls and variance rises though, surprisingly, skewness increases whilst
kurtosis falls. The rise in skewness is not matched by an examination of the quantiles of
the distribution. There, in Figure 3.3 the lower tail of outcomes falls quite significantly,
more so than the middle and top of the distribution. In words, the distribution of poor
turnover outcomes faced by businesses is getting more negative and more extreme around
recessionary periods, which are shaded in Figure 3.2.
4Defined as 2*(New-Old)/(New+Old), putting equal weight on both elements of the change in the
denominator.
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Figure 3.2: Moments for equal-weighted % change in turnover by year. Years with more
than 6 months of OECD recession indicator shaded.
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Figure 3.3: Deciles of equal-weighted % change in turnover by year, period including Great
Recession.
The turnover figures are preferable for model calibration compared to employment
moments as small firms or lone self-employed entrepreneurs have a very discrete level
84
of employment and thus large and lumpy changes if and when they change their hir-
ing. Whilst the distribution of employment change quantiles shows a similar pattern to
turnover, it is harder to interpret due to a strong presence of lumpy changes from the
very many small firms 5. The model is not designed for representing this discrete hiring
behaviour accurately, as employment beyond an entrepreneur’s own labour is continuous.
3.3.3 Calibration
Income taxes are characterised by the functional form in Gouveia and Strauss [1994],
whilst estate taxes use the format and calibration strategy of Cagetti and Nardi [2004],
which studies the impact of estate tax changes upon entrepreneurs and the wealth distri-
bution. Pensions p are paid at the ratio of UK state pensions to mean earnings, similar
to the ratio from Kotlikoff et al. [1999] in Cagetti and Nardi [2006].
The worker ability process y and Πy is a discretised AR1 in logs, calibrated to the
earnings Gini and the Shorrocks Index in the WAS data and UK earnings administrative
data examined in De Nardi et al. [2018]. The simplicity of the worker process is due to
the focus on entrepreneurial dynamics and choices. De Nardi et al. [2016] use very rich
worker earnings dynamics (which exclude entrepreneurs) and find a better match to lower
tail inequality and savings behaviour of the poor but they find little improvement of fit
for upper wealth quantiles, where entrepreneurial dynamics and our targets are mainly
located.
The parameters are calibrated to a stationary model with permanently low turbulence
/ non-recessionary state, with the target ranges from the data and output from the model
shown below in Table 3.3, and parameters and values shown in Table 3.2. The parameters
use the same notation as in the model exposition6 in Section 3.2.
Parameter definition label best fit values
Discount factor β 0.932
Borrowing limit λ 0.35
Entr. capital share αe 0.56
Entr. DRS ν 0.74
Entr. ability upper limit θh 3.25
Entr. ability lower limit θl 1.35
Entr. ability entry P (θ1|θ0) 0.012
Entr. ability exit level 1 1.6
Entr. ability exit curvature 2 1.25
Entr. ability variance σ2η 0.22
Table 3.2: Parameters
The targets and their ranges are taken from the WAS and the BSD. These targets
are similar to those used in Cagetti and Nardi [2006] and related papers. As the WAS is
5The UK firm size distribution is power-law distributed, much like other firm size distributions as noted
by Luttmer [2007], Luttmer [2010] and Gabaix [2009] amongst others
6‘Entr.’ refers to ‘Entrepreneur’.
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biennial, the targets for entrepreneurial household transitions are also biennial and two
year transitions are calculated from the model to match the data. The model is itself
annual, like the BSD data. The overall match to targets is good, and the model captures
the data (stylised) facts regarding the position of entrepreneurs, mobility and the wealth
distribution in the UK. Unlike previous work, the use of the WAS in calibration means both
the facts about the top of the wealth distribution and the longitudinal facts come from the
same database (and those not used in the calibration can become testable predictions).
Most of the target definitions are self-explanatory, except for “IQR of turnover changes”
and “Median Entr : Median Worker wealth”, which refer respectively to the inter-quartile
range of equal-weighted percentage changes in turnover from the BSD and the ratio of
median wealth of entrepreneurs versus median wealth of workers.
Target definition data range model value
% entrepreneurs 3.6-5.5 4.8
% entrepreneurs exit in 2 years 37-48 40
% entrepreneurs enter in 2 years 1.8-2.3 2
% entrepreneurs do not hire 41-59 48
Median Entr : Median Worker wealth 2.9-3.5 3.3
Top 1% wealth share 16-21% 23
% entrepreneur in Top 1% 34-39 37
Entrepreneur wealth share % 17-20 18.7
Capital:Income ratio (K:Y) 2.4-2.6 2.45
IQR turnover changes 0.32-0.34 0.33
Table 3.3: Targets
Although each parameter does not have a unique link to a target, there are some
clear economic intuitions. The borrowing limit λ raises entrepreneurial borrowing lim-
its, inequality and entrepreneurial income, though it also reduces pressure on poorer en-
trepreneurs to gather assets and overcome their constraints. The capital share αe and DRS
ν of the entrepreneurial production function are strongly linked to the proportion of en-
trepreneurs in the top 1%, proportion of entrepreneurs hiring and wealth of entrepreneurs
as they provide incentives for entrepreneurs to gather capital (rather than use labour).
The K:Y ratio constrains the amount of capital accumulated by entrepreneurs and is
strongly related to the discount factor β. The limits for the entrepreneurial ability process
θl and θh affect inequality very strongly and are constrained by targets for the wealth of
entrepreneurs. The entry and exit of entrepreneurs is closely determined by the entry and
exit process for ability, as would be expected. Variance of the ability shock is almost solely
determined by the match to the inter-quartile range of changes in log turnover from the
BSD.
There is tension between the calibration having enough entrepreneurial wealth (%
wealth held by entrepreneurs) whilst maintaining low enough inequality (top 1% share
of wealth), sufficient non-hiring and reasonable median wealth ratios. The more wealth
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entrepreneurs have, the more significant they are to the economy. A Low DRS param-
eter ν and a big spread of entrepreneurial ability θh − θl generates a high proportion of
entrepreneurs in the top 1%, the top 1% share and matches median entrepreneur:worker
wealth ratio. The entry and exit parameters determine the entrepreneurial population,
and lower exit or higher entry does raise inequality/entrepreneurial wealth targets as would
be expected. Entrepreneurs are generally rich, and become richer on average when they
have longer expected tenure with a positive entrepreneurial ability and the resultant high
income.
3.4 Aggregate Equilibria and Krusell-Smith Aggregation
I will explore two sets of shocks. Firstly, a ‘standard’ reduction in TFP during a
recession (much like Krusell and Smith Jr. [1998] without changes in earnings transitions).
Secondly, an increase in variance of entrepreneurial shocks as noted in the turnover data
(and following the literature on dispersion increases during recessions). My objective is to
study the impact of credit-constrained entrepreneurs.
The aggregate state is a two-state process (normal, recession) with transition proba-
bilities based upon the average lengths of recessions from UK aggregate data, taken from
the Federal Reserve bank of St Louis FRED database. When the recession is characterised
as a mean reduction in TFP, it is calibrated by the difference between the Bank of Eng-
land’s TFP estimates in the two states, which is -0.8%7. Turbulence shocks are instead
calibrated using the increase in inter-quartile range from Figure 3.3 that occurs in 2009-11
versus the earlier period, which is 0.54 as opposed to 0.36. When this is calibrated to the
model, η has a standard deviation of 0.22 and 0.36 in the normal and recessionary states
respectively.
This model does not follow the Krusell-Smith (K-S) mean-only aggregation result,
whereby the economy and its required forecasts can be predicted with great accuracy using
only the current aggregate state and mean level of capital. Usually, models with aggregate
shocks and heterogeneity rely on a simple forecast rule of K ′ = α + βK conditional on
z. Here, the forecast rules need to use the lagged shock value and lagged interest rate
for prediction and forecasting dynamics. This indicates it ‘matters’ to forecasts whether
the economy is in a high or a low turbulence state previously and this information is not
fully transmitted through the total capital stock. One can infer that the order of shocks
and their combination influences dynamics significantly. The reasons behind this become
clear when studying the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) in the next section - each
aggregate shock changes the allocation of capital amongst individuals who may have a lot
of capital, which influences aggregate dynamics when entrepreneurs are involved.
7Bank of England, Total Factor Productivity Growth in the United Kingdom [TFPGUKA], retrieved
from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TFPGUKA.
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Table 3.4: Equilibrium Accuracy tests (MAE in %)
Model R2K′ MAEK′ R
2
r MAEr
Level z shocks 0.9993 0.60 0.9988 0.11
Turbulence shocks 0.987 0.08 0.981 0.27
K-S equity model 0.99999 - 0.99999 -
Throughout, the two accuracy measures used to evaluate the accuracy of the equilib-
rium are the simulation R2 and a version of the test from Haan [2010], which uses the
maximum absolute error (MAE) over a simulation period, both shown in Table 3.4. Den
Haan’s test is significantly stricter and detects numerical aggregation errors that the R2
measure may not. It has a simple intuition which is easy to compare over models - in every
simulation used as part of convergence iterations or in the test, this is the maximum devi-
ation between a sequence simulated using the forecast rules alone and a separate sequence
from the full model using the same shocks.
Once extra predictors are included, the model with TFP-mean-only shocks has good
forecast rules according to the R2 measure and the maximum absolute error test of Haan
[2010] to evaluate. In the turbulence shock model, there is a lower R2 but not large
maximum absolute deviations over a simulation.
The source for the lack of aggregation is the difficulty of inferring entrepreneurial
behaviour from aggregates - entrepreneurs are very much affected by their individual
heterogeneity and personal history and, particularly under turbulence shocks, this affects
the economy.
With level shocks alone, the model performs better on these tests, with high R2 similar
to K-S models that follow the mean-only aggregation result and maximum absolute errors
of less than 1% over the entire simulation (10000 periods). Turbulence shocks have lower
R2 and, as well as the greater impact of entrepreneurial heterogeneity, this is due to the
compensation of the corporate sector in response to shocks to the entrepreneurial sector.
This results in much smaller K and r variation and thus the R2 is lower but the maximum
absolute error (the stricter test in terms of deviations from forecasts) is still very low.
3.5 Aggregate and Inequality Dynamics and Mechanisms -
IRFs and TFP
To explain the model’s shock dynamics, I now present impulse response functions
(IRFs). These are the mean response of a variable to a change in state for normal to re-
cessionary conditions. There are two things to note - firstly, the extensive response of the
entrepreneurial sector to a shock, which is longer than a non-entrepreneurial model with-
out constraints (which is similar to the response of the unconstrained corporate sector).
Secondly, by contrast to a more usual mean-changing shock, I note the novel effects of the
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turbulence shock with entrepreneurs, particularly in persistence of capital changes and the
strong sectoral differences. Mean-only shocks affecting all entrepreneurs and corporates
equally also show the amplifying power of the entrepreneurial sector.
3.5.1 Effects of level shocks
On the aggregate level, the response of the economy to a downwards TFP shock af-
fecting both corporates and entrepreneurs in figure 3.4 looks very much like a response
to a level shock to economy-wide TFP in many standard models. The economy begins
in state 1 (the normal state) in period 1 at the start of the graph and moves to state
2 in period 2. This impulse response function is formed from an average of simulations.
Since the economy begins in state 1, which has higher TFP, these variables begin above
the average levels for a simulation. Output, investment and consumption all fall following
the shock, as does the capital stock. The responses follow the well-recognised relation
that investment is more volatile than output and consumption less (and by reasonable
magnitudes). Then, the economy, having fallen below the average level recovers towards
the simulated mean. After 20 years, the output and investment level are at the mean,
but the capital and consumption levels are still below (though they do return to the mean
within 50 years).
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Index of IRF
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
ho
ck
 s
ta
rt 
po
in
t
Output
Y
Start (state 1)
Mean Y
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Index of IRF
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
ho
ck
 s
ta
rt 
po
in
t
Capital
K
Start (state 1)
Mean K
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Index of IRF
-0.12
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
ho
ck
 s
ta
rt 
po
in
t
Consumption
C
Start (state 1)
Mean C
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Index of IRF
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
ho
ck
 s
ta
rt 
po
in
t
Investment
I
Start (state 1)
Mean I
Figure 3.4: Average IRFs for aggregate measures, shock from normal to recession state in
period 1 to 2.
If one examines the breakdown of responses into corporate and entrepreneurial sectors
in figure 3.5, entrepreneurial production and resource usage (both labour and capital) fall
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much more dramatically than the corporate equivalents or the overall economic response.
There is an amplifying effect in the entrepreneurial output reduction versus the shock size,
as the entrepreneurial output has an initial fall of -0.97%, an extra 0.17% versus the shock
amount and therefore over 20% larger than the size of the original shock.
Entrepreneurial capital has a very large response to the shock relative to the aggregate
response - approximately three times larger at the fullest extent of both responses, 4
years after the shock (in period 5). The corporate capital stock initially rises, as there is a
substitution of capital from the entrepreneurial to the corporate sector. This model has no
frictions on the movement of capital between different sectors in the lending market, thus
the corporate sector dampens the overall effect on the capital stock, as well as providing
lenders the ability to move their capital away from the entrepreneurial sector easily.
It takes a particularly long time for the entrepreneurial capital stock to return to the
average level, given the severity of the fall. In labour usage, the narrative is similar,
with the exception that the overall stock of labour does not change in this model, thus
there is only a substitution effect. The entrepreneurial sector employs significantly less
labour, which is absorbed by the representative corporate firm. The slow entrepreneurial
capital recovery and large effects upon entrepreneurs speaks to an inverse version of the
‘financial accelerator’ mechanism in Bernanke et al. [1999], Kiyotaki and Moore [1997]
and Bernanke and Gertler [1989] - entrepreneurs need to save (invest) their own assets
to build their businesses and this process is slowed by reduced productivity, reduced bor-
rowing and reduced profits to invest, generating a propagation mechanism. In this case,
a compensating corporate sector dampens the aggregate response.
In this framework, there is a non-trivial wealth distribution which supports the ex-
planation above and can lend insight into the mechanisms at work. Figure 3.6 shows the
wealth changes experienced by different groups in the wealth distribution. The wealthier
subsets experience an initially softer fall in wealth (as a group), because of their increased
ability to self-insure against shocks. But, seven years after the impact, the proportional
wealth decreases for the wealthier begin to exceed groups including less wealthy members
such that the maximum negative impact on wealth of the top 1% is after 15 years, versus
6 years for the top 50%. Further, this negative impact is larger and takes longer to resolve
for the richer. This aligns with the larger proportion of entrepreneurs in the very top
wealth groups and the longer, deeper impact of the shock upon entrepreneurial capital
and production.
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Figure 3.5: IRFs for entrepreneurial and corporate sectoral quantities, shock from normal
to recession state in period 1 to 2.
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Figure 3.6: IRF for the wealth held by different groups, level shocks.
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3.5.2 Effects of turbulence shocks
Examining turbulence shocks, we also see large changes in the entrepreneurial sector,
which are also significantly compensated by the corporate sector. Note that the levels
of the productivity states are unchanged as the turbulence only affects entrepreneurial
productivity transition probabilities. In the model, the transition probabilities are realised
at the end of the period, so there is an initial rise in saving due to precautionary motives
from the full knowledge of a turbulent state affecting the end of the first period. This causes
an initial rise in investment, output and capital, and a negative response of consumption.
Quickly, this is replaced with an inversion of these changes, with investment, output and
capital all falling. Consumption remains elevated for some time, from a combination of a
reduced interest rate and smoothing behaviour.
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Figure 3.7: Average IRFs for aggregate measures, shock from normal to recession state in
period 1 to 2.
Moving on from the aggregate dynamics, once the shocks are realised in the second
period of the simulation, there is a large and rapid drop in entrepreneurial capital and
output. This change is very much larger than that of the TFP-style shocks discussed
earlier, with a fall over 1.5% in output and over 2% in capital. The corporate sector’s
ability to compensate for the changes explains the comparatively muted aggregate response
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from the economy, though there is an aggregate drop, as discussed above.
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Figure 3.8: IRFs for entrepreneurial and corporate sectoral quantities, shock from normal
to recession state in period 1 to 2.
After the initial effects driven by precautionary motives, previously productive and
relatively unconstrained entrepreneurs fall down the ability ladder, have tighter borrowing
constraints (here, the more complex borrowing constraint is important - a simple multiple
of assets rule would weaken this mechanism) and so are less able to produce and have lower
input demand. Their capacity to produce is not replaced by new/smaller entrepreneurs
due to the stronger impact of these borrowing constraints, and the corporate sector is
a less efficient user of this newly ‘leftover’ capital. There is thus a shift of resources
into the corporate sector due to the financial frictions. Through the introduction of new
entrepreneurs and low-turbulence productivity transitions, the economy fully returns to
its average state over approximately 30 years.
Even though the shock is symmetric, and despite the greater density of entrepreneurs
at the lowest (entry) level of ability meaning more entrepreneurs will be able to move up
versus down, the downward effect dominates over the medium term 1-5 years after the
shock, and longer for capital.
This mechanism fits well with that examined in Moll [2014] concerning self-financing
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and borrowing constraints. In that work, which is far more theoretically focused than
this quantitative exercise, increasing the persistence of entrepreneurial ability increases
the efficiency of the allocation of capital, as more able entrepreneurs build wealth faster
and thus acquire more assets, improving aggregate productivity.
Here, the same effect applies - when turbulence is reduced, entrepreneurial ability is
more persistent and output is indeed higher, whereas an increase in turbulence increases
the relative misallocation of capital and strengthens the role of borrowing constraints.
This is especially stark if one considers a rich entrepreneur at the top of the ability scale,
who falls to the bottom and exits through the high attrition of entrepreneurs with low
ability. Now, their entire capital stock is passively invested in the general capital market,
earning r and only given to constrained entrepreneurs who can borrow it or the corporate
sector.
Relatively, this usage is less efficient than a highly productive entrepreneur using the
capital for their own production and to collateralise their own borrowing (the average en-
trepreneur earning marginal returns at around 25%). In essence, financing constraints en-
sure inefficiency by preventing the most productive entrepreneurs acquiring capital rapidly
and turbulence limits the alternative of self-financing by building a personal asset base.
This corresponds to the effects upon inequality observed in figure 3.9. The wealth of
the richest shrinks by more than those lower in the wealth distribution, reducing inequal-
ity under turbulence. The richest groups have a much greater density of entrepreneurs,
and thus are more affected by the turbulence, as well as having a greater income from
capital if not entrepreneurs, thus suffering more from the (small) interest rate reduction
accompanying the turbulence increase. The greater initial precautionary saving and much
slower impact on the wealth of the richest, seen particularly for the top 1% groups and
above, is very likely to be a result of the slow recovery in entrepreneurial capital and out-
put described above. These differentials are quite large, as the top 50% has a maximum
reduction in assets of significantly less than 0.1% seven years later whilst the top 0.1% has
a reduction approximately ten times larger, at 0.85%, twenty years later. The large assets
of the top 1 and 0.1% (who hold, respectively, 20% and 5% of aggregate wealth) indicates
that the absolute amounts of capital are still large, and are especially large compared to
the effects upon the wealth distribution observed in figure 3.6 with TFP-level shocks.
Comparing between the different shock processes, we can evaluate the relative effects on
the length of the aggregate output recovery in figure 3.10. The diagram plots the relative
recovery of output from the IRF’s trough to the simulation mean, scaled proportionately
from 0 (trough) to 1 (mean). As a benchmark, a version of the model with a zero density of
entrepreneurs is included in the figure, with the same size TFP shocks as in Section 3.5.1.
The inclusion of entrepreneurs in the model, whilst keeping the same size shocks (and
same sequences to generate the IRF), there is a reduction in the rate of recovery from
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Figure 3.9: IRF for the wealth held by different groups, turbulence shocks.
the trough point, with the benchmark economy achieving a ‘full’ recovery to the mean
output in 4.5 years, as opposed to 4.8 when including entrepreneurs. As noted above, this
ignores the very large difference between sectors and does not account for not capturing
the cross-sectional wealth distribution when not including entrepreneurs.
Turbulence shocks are substantially different. The full recovery occurs at approxi-
mately the same time as the other models, but the initial response is much slower, before
gathering higher speed and overshooting the mean output. The speed-up and eventual out-
performance is due to the symmetric upside of the turbulence shock. Over a long enough
time, the greater density of entrepreneurs at higher entrepreneurial abilities gather in-
creasing resources and expand their constraints, creating output growth which can gather
pace as they grow, before the eventual stochastic return to the average entrepreneurial
distribution.
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models. Trough is 0, average simulated output is 1, representing a full recovery.
3.6 Conclusion and Developments
I have presented a model for understanding the role of aggregate shocks and en-
trepreneurs, small businesses and personal wealth fluctuations. This model demonstrates
that fluctuations that are within the bounds of firm-level data have large and highly persis-
tent effects on the aggregate economy through entrepreneurial households. The existence
of entrepreneurial constraints and turbulence together creates capital misallocation and
transmits micro-level changes into aggregate fluctuations - as claimed at the very start,
‘who has wealth matters’. I consider the data on entrepreneurship and the dynamics of
enterprises in the UK and offer a quantitatively evaluated heterogeneous version of the
‘financial accelerator’ channel, showing that non-directional dispersion in entrepreneurial
productivity can have large and persistent effects, as well as entrepreneurial behaviour’s
amplifying effects in responses to common TFP-style shock processes.
The entrepreneurial modelling provides rich insights and I find that the effects of shocks
upon the entrepreneurial production sector are much larger than aggregate effects due to
the compensating role of the unconstrained corporate sector in this model. The role of fric-
tions between the two sectors or within the corporate sector limiting the dampening effect
and exacerbating fluctuations or potentially providing different responses is of substantial
interest to those interested in the performance of the economy and business constraints.
In the UK, entrepreneurs are only a small part of the population and not as rich as their
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U.S. equivalents, so we would expect larger effects if calibrated to the U.S.A.
This model can be developed further. One key dimension is to include features such
as personal loss of capital from business collapse, negative income or ‘disaster shocks’.
The current framework does not create very large changes in the distribution of wealth
between groups, without very large or persistent turbulence shocks, likely because it does
not include risk and the destruction of capital when an entrepreneur/owner closes or
loses a firm. Extending the model of entrepreneurial businesses to include more complex
borrowing, ownership and choice of investment in the firm is something that would likely
yield interesting results, but richer entrepreneurial/firm data would be needed. Similarly,
the turbulence itself could be represented with other parameterisations accounting for
different moments of the distribution of firm dynamics and household mobility.
I also discuss inequality, showing how calibrated recessionary turbulence in entrepreneurial
ability can reduce inequality in the short run. The turbulent entrepreneurship mechanism
has the possibility of explaining longer term transitions and developments in inequality
than the business cycle environment depicted here. For example, the decreasing down-
wards mobility amongst top income groups seen in Guvenen et al. [2014a] since the 1980’s
and increasing inequality align with the results from this work. Further, the process for
workers in this model is very simple, and turbulence-style earnings and capital income
shocks affecting non-entrepreneurs and the poor may also be important to explanations
for changing inequality and mobility in earnings, income and wealth.
In sum, this chapter demonstrates the importance of capital-constrained entrepreneurs
in heterogeneous models not just for replicating the cross-sectional distribution of wealth or
public finance questions but also as a transmission mechanism for shocks to the economy.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions
This thesis investigates the wealth distribution in the UK and the related role of
entrepreneurship in the economy. Each chapter has its own conclusions and suggestions for
development, but there is one constant thread - understanding the mobility and behaviour
of the wealthy is important to understanding the economy. Whilst there is (rightly) great
focus on poverty in studies of inequality, the large holdings of the wealthy and their
involvement in entrepreneurship and investment make them an important consideration
for public policy and academic enquiry. Whilst not tackling the longer term trends of rising
wealth and income of the very wealthiest groups versus the remainder of the population,
this thesis demonstrates top wealth inequality and mobility should be a matter of interest
for both those thinking about about equity, those optimising welfare and those considering
the stability of the economy.
I find that wealth is not stable, with large movements amongst those at the very top.
Business wealth and entrepreneurship is a key element in these movements, especially
the largest changes. The importance of heterogeneity in returns gives a clear message
to the literature that variation in earnings alone is not driving the patterns in mobility,
and that individual exposure to different returns on wealth is key. The importance of
downwards movements in wealth is a demonstration that destruction and loss of wealth is
an important mechanism affecting the wealthy, which deserves further investigation.
Chapter one provides a careful examination of wealth data in the UK, where I con-
clude that the WAS dataset is a good representation of the wealthy and provides interesting
and important facts about the cross-sectional distribution of wealth and novel implications
about the mobility of the wealthiest in the UK. Chapter two builds upon this work and im-
plements structural estimation of different theories of wealth inequality, and discerns that
returns heterogeneity is important to match both the static empirical inequality present
and the high mobility amongst the wealthy. The estimations provide evidence against the-
ories of wealth accumulation based on extraordinary earnings or different preferences, due
to their reliance on immobility to generate inequality. Chapter three develops the facts
about entrepreneurship from chapter one and combines with data on UK firms to work
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with a macroeconomic model of entrepreneurship, aggregate shocks and the wealth distri-
bution. It finds that constrained entrepreneurs exacerbate the effect of TFP shocks often
used to drive fluctuations in the Real Business Cycle literature, and are thus important
to understanding business cycle variability. I also use the business data for ‘turbulence
shocks’, which increase the variability and uncertainty of entrepreneurial productivity.
These shocks have interesting effects, and suggest that this turbulence can contribute to
explanations of changing wealth inequality and medium-term (5 years-20 years) economic
fluctuations.
I look forward to developing the themes in this work further, to the impact that this
work has and am pleased at any assistance or insight it provides to researchers or other
interested parties in the future.
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Appendix A
Appendix for supporting data and
further details
A.0.1 Supporting transitions data
ELSA data has similar patterns to the WAS in terms of top wealth transitions, although
it has a smaller sample of the top 1 and 0.1%, so a number of conditional moments are not
calculable (or are extremely lumpy). We see the ‘stayers stay’ pattern in top groups and
around a third of the top 5% exit that group between every biennial wave. The gradual
decrease in the number staying in the group over time is present at the top 10%, but not
clearly demonstrated above this (unlike the WAS, which has the pattern up to the top
0.1%).
top 10% top 5% top 1% top 0.1%
1-2 0.71 0.65 0.52 0.10
1-3 0.67 0.57 0.51 0.00
1-4 0.65 0.55 0.38 0.29
1-5 0.65 0.58 0.44 0.00
1-6 0.62 0.56 0.38 0.00
1-7 0.62 0.59 0.52 0.41
Table A.1: ELSA: Staying rates in top wealth groups over waves.
A.0.2 Person level wealth
The value of main residences and some physical wealth is collected at the household
level and must be allocated to individuals to create person-level total wealth. The main
residence and household physical wealth1 are allocated equally to the head of household2
and their partner, if one is present, and otherwise to the head of household entirely.
Alternatives include allocating entirely to the head of household, the partner-splitting
approach and an equal split amongst adults in the household. As most households have
1Household contents, vehicles and collectibles.
2Also known as household reference person.
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one or two adults, the third assumption makes little difference. Unsurprisingly, the head
of household-only assumption leads to greater concentration of wealth but by less than 2
percentage points for the top 1% share. Later, exploration of wealth excluding housing
obviously bypasses this issue.
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Figure A.1: Wealth shares of Top 1% for Person level WAS.
The movement from household to person level in figure A.1 increases wealth shares
a small amount, but clearly the same patterns are present. The changes are also within
predicted bounds from Crossley et al. [2016] for person- versus household-level measure-
ments.
A.0.3 WAS estate-comparable dataset
There are a number of less important changes are needed to create an estate-comparable
WAS dataset. Estate data only includes those over 18. For WAS waves 1, 2 and 4 exclud-
ing individuals below 18 is difficult as age is in banded categories which do not overlap
with that limit. I explored ways to mitigate this problem, but found no difference to
results because 16-20 year olds generally have very little wealth. As a result, in waves 1,2
and 4 the estate-comparable database also exclude 19 year olds, as the most direct option.
For wave 3 and 5, age is directly provided and thus cleanly comparable to estate data.
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A.0.4 Calculating total income and tax paying in the WAS
The WAS does not directly have a total income variable, either in net or gross value in
the end-user data. Income in the WAS is recorded under the following broad categories:
• (labour or self-employed) earnings
• pension income
• social benefit income
• investment income
• rental income
• other income (royalties, gambling, irregular income, etc)
Some of these items are collected both pre- and post-tax, others vary. Some items,
such as income from bonuses allow respondents to choose to offer either a pre- or post-tax
value but not both. It is therefore difficult to construct total income directly from the
variables in the dataset, as UK income taxes and national insurance are calculated based
on total income from all sources rather than item by item.
In order to represent incomes as accurately as possible, I first construct tax functions
for income tax and national insurance for 2006-2014. I then create a weighted average
function of these for each wave period. For example, as the first wave covers 06-08 and
respondents are interviewed at different times, the taxes in force over this period are
weighted in line with their respective length of enforcement.
Incrementally, I apply/invert3 these tax functions to each item of an individual’s income
- so first inferring net and gross earnings income, then adding pension income to that
total and apply the next set of incremental taxes and so on. In effect, this replicates
the procedure used by tax collecting agencies. There are subtleties within this, such as
different limits at different ages, different tax of pension income from overseas, etc, which
are accounted for. This is broadly the procedure and ordering used by the tax authority.
However, this cannot account for some key rebates. Firstly, large dividend income
is taxed at a lower rate than other capital income (10% lower than the maximum rate
for other income). The WAS asks for investment income from all sources as a single
figure, so one cannot isolate income from shares in order to apply this. The procedure
is therefore likely to over-tax the wealthy, who hold more shares. It also cannot account
for tax rebates on rental income. In the UK, landlords are able to reclaim tax based on
mortgage payments for the rented property. Landlords can potentially pay near-zero tax
on rental income on this basis. The procedure simply applies full tax to rental income.
3A minimising algorithm infers the gross income where there is only have net income, as the functions
are not explicitly invertible, but are one-to-one.
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Again, this is likely to over-tax the wealthy. There are also income tax rebates available
to those making investments in small businesses or charitable donations, at substantial
rates - the ‘EIS’ (Enterprise Investment Scheme) delivers an income tax credit of 30% of
the value of an investment and the ‘Seed’ version of the scheme offers 50%. There are
also a multitude of subsidy and rebate schemes for business owners. Therefore, again, the
procedure is likely to over-tax the wealthy, especially those with business wealth.
As well as those rebates, there is no correction for student loan repayment. Recently,
the UK government provides student loans and grants centrally and requires loan repay-
ment via additional tax on income. The WAS does not gather the amount the former
student pays off, only the outstanding amount. Tax paid is usually 9% over a threshold,
up to the outstanding loan amount, however, it also depends on features of the individ-
ual’s personal history and loans are cancelled after a very long period of low earnings.
This affects a relatively small number of individuals in the WAS, less than 1%, due to the
relatively late introduction of widespread student loans to the UK ensuring only a small
adult population is affected in the survey. Other UK sources do not include student loan
repayment in their net income measures.
Finally, irregular income is excluded. The reasoning for removing this small item is
that the taxation of this income is hard to calculate. Inherited items are included in
the WAS directly as transfers of wealth, rather than income items. Irregular income in
the WAS concerns payouts from insurance schemes, gambling and lump sum redundancy
payments. General redundancy payments are included in the income measure and few
respondents mention lump sum redundancy payments here, possibly as they include it
earlier in the income questioning process.
Overall, the gross and net income imputation is likely to overtax the wealthy, even
prior to considering tax avoidance and evasion. Given the good match to the income data
in the World Income Database, which uses administrative data akin to the SPI, I am
confident that these oversights do not damage the analysis. The lower income in the WAS
database at very high income quantiles is likely due to factors such as the above, as well
as measurement error and other common causes.
Each wave contains its own minor problems, which are dealt with on a case-by-case
basis and details are available upon request, where taxes paid or benefits received are
calculated by combining headline rates with eligibility conditions.
A.0.5 Attrition
There are multiple methods to deal with attrition - (multiple) imputation; reweighting
using sample exit propensity and simple rescaling/removing.
I argue that, for the household-level WAS, simple rescaling is the best option as exit
appears to be at random. Reweighting using inverse estimated sample exit propensity is
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likely to introduce substantial noise. Multiple imputation of all variables for all waves
for all exiting households/individuals over the entire sample would be risky - with around
30% of the sample lost to attrition in each wave, imputed data would be the majority of
the dataset by wave 3 or 4.
Much like the ONS’ longitudinal weights for individuals, one can use a binary model to
predict household sample exit, and then reweight to account for any differential attrition
propensity in order to reconstruct a ‘correctly’ weighted sample. However, when applying
this analysis to the household level WAS, the logistic regression normally used for such a
procedure is extremely poor at predicting exit.
To demonstrate this, it is compared to a low benchmark - if one were to take the sample
attrition rate and allocate exit randomly to respondents at this rate, one would obtain the
matrix in table A.3 when comparing this ‘model’ to the data. By pure chance, one would
correctly identify some leavers. One could easily do better, for example by predicting ’all
stay’. Comparing the random allocation to the logistic model when engineered to generate
the right proportion of exit (and thus be comparable in a simple manner) in Table A.2,
the logistic model does somewhat better. But, its level of false positive and false negative
are extremely high (the two non-diagonal cells) and close to the benchmark of random
allocation. Examining the correct-classification-ratio for all three transitions in table A.4,
the logistic model is not far ahead of the random benchmark throughout and is worse than
simply predicting none leave. This is concerning for implementing such a model to predict
exit and then reweighting with the inverse of its implied probabilities - high predicted exit
probabilities of, say, 80% would be more than doubly weighted but given that the attrition
model appears to include a lot of noise, reweighting using these noise predictions has the
potential to damage rather than improve estimates.
Model/Data D0 D1
M0 0.41 0.2
M1 0.20 0.2
Table A.2: Distribution of Model binary exit predictions versus data. (Exit=1) Wave 1-2.
D0 D1
M0 0.37 0.24
M1 0.24 0.16
Table A.3: Distribution of random binary exit predictions versus data. (Exit=1) Wave
1-2.
The poor performance of the logistic exit regression directly suggests that simple ran-
dom attrition is occurring. Indeed, directly studying attrition rates by wealth and income
categories (since these would be areas particularly concerning to this study), there is not
any large variation. In the main text, random attrition is used. In this section are some
calculations for staying in top wealth categories showing exit when accounting for differ-
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Wave W1-2 W2-3 W3-4
Model 0.60 0.63 0.63
Random 0.52 0.57 0.57
P(Stay) 0.60 0.69 0.68
Table A.4: Correct Classification Ratio for model and random raw probability assignment
with raw probability of staying in sample.
ential propensity to leave by wealth category.
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from/to top 0.1% top 0.1-1% top 1-5% top 5-10% <top 10% NA
top 0.1% 0.26 0.19 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.33
top 0.1-1% 0.03 0.33 0.17 0.04 0.04 0.39
top 1-5% 0.00 0.05 0.37 0.13 0.08 0.37
top 5-10% 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.29 0.25 0.33
<top 10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.56 0.42
Table A.5: Transitional Probabilities for top wealth groups across WAS waves 1-2 (07-09),
household wealth. Includes exit as ‘NA’.
top 0.1% top 0.1-1% top 1-5% top 5-10% <top 10% NA
top 0.1% 0.36 0.41 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.12
top 0.1-1% 0.01 0.38 0.23 0.01 0.01 0.36
top 1-5% 0.00 0.05 0.42 0.17 0.08 0.28
top 5-10% 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.36 0.26 0.28
<top 10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.65 0.33
Table A.6: Transitional Probabilities for top wealth groups across WAS waves 2-3 (09-11),
household wealth. Includes exit as ‘NA’.
top 0.1% top 0.1-1% top 1-5% top 5-10% <top 10% NA
top 0.1% 0.30 0.25 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.37
top 0.1-1% 0.02 0.36 0.18 0.01 0.03 0.40
top 1-5% 0.00 0.04 0.45 0.16 0.07 0.28
top 5-10% 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.39 0.23 0.26
<top 10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.65 0.33
Table A.7: Transitional Probabilities for top wealth groups across WAS waves 3-4 (11-13),
household wealth. Includes exit as ‘NA’.
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from/to top 0.1% top 0.1-1% top 1-5% top 5-10% <top 10%
top 0.1% 0.39 0.28 0.15 0.04 0.14
top 0.1-1% 0.05 0.54 0.28 0.06 0.06
top 1-5% 0.00 0.08 0.59 0.20 0.13
top 5-10% 0.00 0.01 0.18 0.43 0.38
<top 10% 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.96
Table A.8: Transitional Probabilities for top wealth groups across WAS waves 1-2 (07-09),
household wealth. Adjusts for sample exit by wealth category.
from/to top 0.1% top 0.1-1% top 1-5% top 5-10% <top 10%
top 0.1% 0.40 0.47 0.13 0.00 0.00
top 0.1-1% 0.02 0.59 0.36 0.02 0.02
top 1-5% 0.00 0.06 0.59 0.24 0.11
top 5-10% 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.51 0.36
<top 10% 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.97
Table A.9: Transitional Probabilities for top wealth groups across WAS waves 2-3 (09-11),
household wealth. Adjusts for sample exit by wealth category.
from/to top 0.1% top 0.1-1% top 1-5% top 5-10% <top 10%
top 0.1% 0.47 0.40 0.13 0.00 0.00
top 0.1-1% 0.04 0.59 0.30 0.02 0.05
top 1-5% 0.00 0.05 0.62 0.22 0.10
top 5-10% 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.54 0.32
<top 10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.98
Table A.10: Transitional Probabilities for top wealth groups across WAS waves 3-4 (11-13),
household wealth. Adjusts for sample exit by wealth category.
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top 10% top 5% top 1% top 0.1%
07-09 0.75 0.71 0.60 0.39
09-11 0.77 0.72 0.64 0.40
11-13 0.79 0.72 0.65 0.47
Table A.11: WAS, proportion staying in top quantile groups across waves, household
wealth. Adjusts for sample exit by wealth category.
A.0.6 Additional Transitions
Below are the Markov matrices for all the wave-to-wave transitions not included in the
main text.
from/to <top 10% top 5-10% top 1-5% top 0.1-1% top 0.1%
<top 10% 0.97 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
top 5-10% 0.43 0.41 0.16 0.01 0.00
top 1-5% 0.15 0.22 0.56 0.08 0.00
top 0.1-1% 0.06 0.07 0.30 0.51 0.06
top 0.1% 0.16 0.04 0.13 0.25 0.41
Table A.12: Transitional Probabilities for top HH WAS wealth groups 07-09.
from/to <top 10% top 5-10% top 1-5% top 0.1-1% top 0.1%
<top 10% 0.97 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
top 5-10% 0.37 0.47 0.15 0.00 0.00
top 1-5% 0.10 0.23 0.60 0.07 0.00
top 0.1-1% 0.02 0.01 0.36 0.58 0.03
top 0.1% 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.48 0.50
Table A.13: Transitional Probabilities for top HH WAS wealth groups 09-11.
from/to <top 10% top 5-10% top 1-5% top 0.1-1% top 0.1%
<top 10% 0.98 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
top 5-10% 0.33 0.50 0.17 0.00 0.00
top 1-5% 0.10 0.21 0.62 0.06 0.01
top 0.1-1% 0.05 0.01 0.28 0.62 0.03
top 0.1% 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.41 0.44
Table A.14: Transitional Probabilities for top HH WAS wealth groups 11-13.
<top 10% top 5-10% top 1-5% top 0.1-1% top 0.1%
<top 10% 0.98 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
top 5-10% 0.34 0.50 0.16 0.00 0.00
top 1-5% 0.09 0.20 0.64 0.06 0.00
top 0.1-1% 0.05 0.02 0.22 0.66 0.04
top 0.1% 0.02 0.00 0.21 0.27 0.49
Table A.15: Transitional Probabilities for top HH WAS wealth groups 13-15.
115
Wealth mobility & transitions including pensions
This section contains transitions including pension wealth. Due to the DB pension
modelling changes in the WAS and the resultant fluctuations, mobility is higher. However,
the patterns of ‘stayers stay’, increased mobility in 07-09 and the quantile regression results
all remain robust to including pensions. In most cases, the patterns described in the main
text become stronger.
top 0.1% top 0.1-1% top 1-5% top 5-10% <top 10%
top 0.1% 0.23 0.31 0.22 0.06 0.17
top 0.1-1% 0.05 0.35 0.30 0.14 0.17
top 1-5% 0.00 0.07 0.58 0.20 0.15
top 5-10% 0.00 0.02 0.16 0.43 0.39
<top 10% 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.96
Table A.16: Transitional Probabilities matrix for 07-09 transition in top quantile groups
for total wealth including pensions
top 0.1% top 0.1-1% top 1-5% top 5-10% <top 10%
top 0.1% 0.40 0.27 0.25 0.08 0.00
top 0.1-1% 0.01 0.45 0.31 0.10 0.13
top 1-5% 0.00 0.08 0.60 0.21 0.10
top 5-10% 0.00 0.01 0.17 0.47 0.36
<top 10% 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.97
Table A.17: Transitional Probabilities matrix for 09-11 transitions in top quantile groups
for total wealth including pensions
top 0.1% top 0.1-1% top 1-5% top 5-10% <top 10%
top 0.1% 0.54 0.32 0.09 0.06 0.00
top 0.1-1% 0.03 0.57 0.32 0.01 0.07
top 1-5% 0.00 0.05 0.61 0.21 0.12
top 5-10% 0.00 0.01 0.17 0.46 0.36
<top 10% 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.97
Table A.18: Transitional Probabilities matrix for 11-13 transitions in top quantile groups
for total wealth including pensions
Extra Conditional Staying Probabilities
Shown here are further conditional probabilities of staying in top wealth groups, as
well as the same for top income groups. Table A.19 shows the conditional probabilities for
the shorter history of wave 3 transitions (versus the wave 4 transitions and more extensive
histories used in the main text) whilst table A.20 shows the same shorter conditional
histories for wave 4 transitions. The conclusions are exactly the same as in the main text
- those with a shorter history in the group (in this case, new entrants with no further
history) are much more likely to leave.
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Table A.21 shows the same table as in the main text, but for income. Again, there is
the same pattern with similar magnitudes to wealth.
These tables include the top 0.1%, unlike the main text. This is to show the unrelia-
bility of conditional transition probabilities at this level. As one can see, sometimes the
probability is 1 (or 0 in some tables not shown here) and experiences much more dramatic
changes due to the small number of observations available for each specific history when
dealing with the top 0.1%.
top 10% top 5% top 1% top 0.1%
P (T3|F1T2) 0.52 0.44 0.37 0.46
P (T3|T1T2) 0.87 0.87 0.81 0.55
Table A.19: Probability of remaining in top wealth groups given different histories, where
‘Tt’ indicates membership in wave t and ‘Ft’ indicates not.
top 10% top 5% top 1% top 0.1%
P (T4|F2T3) 0.50 0.42 0.47 0.06
P (T4|T2T3) 0.88 0.86 0.83 0.71
Table A.20: Probability of remaining in top wealth groups given different histories, where
‘Tt’ indicates membership in wave t and ‘Ft’ indicates not.
top 10% top 5% top 1% top 0.1%
P (T4|F1F2T3) 0.43 0.41 0.46 0.35
P (T4|F1T2T3) 0.70 0.63 0.43 1.00
P (T4|T1T2T3) 0.80 0.79 0.82 1.00
Table A.21: Probability of remaining in top income groups given different histories, where
‘Tt’ indicates membership in wave t and ‘Ft’ indicates not.
A.0.7 Further Quantile regression diagrams and outputs
Log Quantile Regressions
Transforming the data into logs (and excluding negative wealth) in figure 1.12, the
majority of the data4 is close to unit root, with an almost linear relationship and slope
similar to 1 for most of the distribution and greater spread for the richest and poorest.
4exp(8) to exp(14) covers below the 10th percentile to above the 99th percentile.
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Figure A.2: Non-Linear Quantile Regression for Log Relative Wealth 2011 vs Log Relative
Wealth 2009.
Linear Quantile Regressions
The linear quantile regression relationship described in reference to figure 1.11 is shown
in figure A.3. The possibility of fixed effects means that quantile regression estimates of
lagged linear coefficients are potentially biased. However, the purpose in this particular
section is not identifying the parameter, but rather showing that different waves all have
the same relationships in terms of mobility. The wave-by-wave linear quantile regression
coefficients are shown in figure A.4.
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Figure A.3: Linear Quantile Regression for Relative Wealth 2009 vs Relative Wealth 2007.
Figure A.4: Linear Quantile Regression Coefficients for Relative Wealth t on Relative
Wealth t− 1 for t = 2009, 2011 & 2013.
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Quantile Regressions of changes
The distribution of changes in log wealth in 2011-13 versus that in 2009-11 is similar to
2009-11 vs 2007-09, but has a relatively small area of flat quantiles with minimal spread,
and the rise in spread further from the origin is relatively more gentle. However, the
general pattern is the same. Similarly, the longer horizon plot of log wealth changes in
2011-13 vs 2007-09 shows the widening volatility/spread away from the origin (particularly
beyond ±0.25) but there is more mobility over proportional changes in the sense that the
curves are flatter, especially in the central region. For most households, most of the time,
biennial proportional changes in wealth are nearly independent with a 4 year horizon, but
have some reversion on a 2 year horizon.
Figure A.5: Non-Linear Quantile Regression for Differences Log Wealth 2013-2011 vs
Differences Log Wealth 2011-2009.
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Figure A.6: Non-Linear Quantile Regression for Differences Log Wealth 2009-2011 vs
Differences Log Wealth 2007-2009.
A.0.8 Percentage and log change distributions
Percentage change places 100% weight on the earlier period as the denominator,
whereas the log difference weights the two periods in the change more equally - with
wealth changes of -90% or 200% in the data, the two measures can be radically different.
However, there is relatively little difference between the changes in log and percentage
change distributions in terms of analysis and conclusions, despite said numerical differ-
ences. Here, I present both log and percentage statistics for additional robustness.
Figure A.7 shows the density of changes in log wealth for the top 5%. The distribution
contains several outliers and has a substantial appearance of negative skew (substantial
density spread to the left of peak versus the right). There is a noticeable difference
between the recessionary transitions (07-09, black) and other transitions (09-11, red and
11-13, green). 2007-2009 has greater spread with a substantially greater appearance of
negative skew. The appearance of skew can be different to the estimated coefficient -
outliers dramatically influence the calculated moments.
Table A.22 presents the Pearson-style empirical moments for the changes in log dis-
tribution. Trimming outliers to±100% shows the influence of the extreme observations in
table A.23. The most obvious and robust time difference is the reduction in mean wealth
change for 07-09 - unsurprisingly, on average, wealth falls in the recession for these house-
holds. The other changes in the empirical moments do not clearly match the conclusions
from the density graph, nor show other clear patterns.
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Figure A.7: Distribution of changes in log household wealth for top 5% in WAS
mean var skew kurt
07-09 -0.24 0.65 -5.31 54.08
09-11 -0.08 0.52 -6.15 83.34
11-13 -0.08 0.39 -0.92 9.65
Table A.22: Moments for change in log household wealth for top 5%
Quantiles of the changes in log wealth for the top 5 and 1% in tables A.24 and A.25 show
similar conclusions to the percentage change tables in the main text - a wider distribution
at the top and large proportional losses.
Moving onto percentage change statistics, the density figure A.8 shows the pattern of
greater left density and heavier outlier presence in 07-09. The moments for percentage
change in wealth do show a reduction in skew (i.e. greater negative skew) in 07-09 (similar
to Guvenen et al’s finding for income in the US Guvenen et al. [2014b]) but also less
variance and kurtosis. This is likely due to percentage changes limiting losses in wealth to
the [0,1] interval (excluding debt) whilst upward changes are unbounded, so more negative
changes will result in less variation contributing to moments.
In table A.26 the % change distribution shows an overall positive mean in 09-11 and
11-13, through this is entirely driven by extreme positive observations and disappears
when trimming these extreme observations in table A.27.
In table A.28, the quantiles of changes in wealth are shown for the top 5%. Those
losing money lose much more money over the 07-09 transition in terms of absolute pounds
(£). The table shows the large amounts that are gained or lost with high probability by
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mean var skew kurt
07-09 -0.16 0.20 -0.18 -0.15
09-11 -0.05 0.18 -0.12 0.62
11-13 -0.05 0.18 -0.26 0.44
Table A.23: 100% trimmed moments for change in log household wealth for top 5%
Quantile 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
07-09 -0.92 -0.42 -0.09 0.13 0.36
09-11 -0.61 -0.26 -0.02 0.17 0.42
11-13 -0.65 -0.27 -0.01 0.17 0.43
Table A.24: Quantiles of changes in log wealth for top 5%.
Quantile 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
07-09 -1.53 -0.82 -0.26 0.10 0.45
09-11 -1.04 -0.44 -0.03 0.21 0.54
11-13 -1.32 -0.51 -0.08 0.14 0.45
Table A.25: Quantiles of changes in log wealth for top 1%.
the wealthy.
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Figure A.8: Distribution of % changes in household wealth for top 5% in WAS
mean var skew kurt
07-09 -0.05 0.36 5.18 54.22
09-11 0.09 0.78 7.20 71.73
11-13 0.09 0.92 7.46 69.47
Table A.26: Moments for % change in household wealth for top 5%
mean var skew kurt
07-09 -0.08 0.17 0.40 0.37
09-11 0.01 0.16 0.52 0.66
11-13 0.00 0.16 0.39 0.60
Table A.27: Moments for % change in household wealth for top 5%, data trimmed at
100%
Quantile 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
07-09 -848991 -373489 -92800 140094 473402
09-11 -579200 -247473 -22349 178751 641100
11-13 -707300 -288104 -8603 214595 697396
Table A.28: Quantiles of changes in household wealth for top 5%
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A.0.9 Further wealth regression details
To predict continuous wealth changes (rather than group exit), the fit of a flexible
machine learning Random Forest algorithm is considered alongside weighted least squares
(WLS) in table A.29. This is restricted to changes amongst the top 5%, following the
focus on the wealthy tail. Polynomials of previous income; changes in income; wealth and
the breakdown of wealth are all significant in various regressions but overall predictive
power is low, as shown by the test-set R2 in table A.29 of less than 0.25. Linear models
perform much worse out-of-sample (in the test set of data), due to extreme observations
dominating residuals even when trimming data, whereas the more successful random forest
has greater flexibility and can avoid this.
Method WLS WLS WLS WLS RF RF
Variable W W log(W ) log(W ) log(W ) log(W )
Trim data? tr tr tr
R2train 0.53 0.10 0.41 0.27 0.88 0.95
R2test 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.23 0.24
Table A.29: Fit statistics for predicting changes in wealth (W), log wealth (log(W)), under
WLS or Random Forest (RF). ‘tr’ indicates trimming at ±200% for log(W) and ±106 for
W. Training set, 5/8 of data, test set 3/8 of data.
The full WLS predictive regression for changes in log and raw wealth uses orthogonal
polynomials (except for factors) of, Total Wealth (as defined in the main text), Property
Wealth, Business Wealth, Net Financial Wealth, Credit Card Balances, Income, Income
Change, Log Income change, Mortgage value, Age of Household Reference Person (HRP),
value of shares, self-employment, Financial Liabilities, (wealthy) hand-to-mouth status5,
Net Income, Mortgage payments, Education level of HRP. Output and changes in log
wealth trimmed to absolute values of 200% for purpose of fit statistics when indicated in
the main text. The Random forest uses the same variables (without utilising polynomials,
since these are unnecessary under the tree methodology).
Least squares regression coefficients for previous income, income changes and log in-
come changes are all highly significant, but do not explain much more than 5% the variation
in the R2 sense. The results for wealth variables tell a similar tale.
5As defined by Violante et al. [2014].
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Feature Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Intercept -0.1898 0.0176 -10.81 0.0000
GI -71.4397 24.8536 -2.87 0.0041
GI square -58.0360 19.2383 -3.02 0.0026
GI cube -5.3412 2.3840 -2.24 0.0253
GId -70.1439 24.2393 -2.89 0.0039
GId square 58.6674 19.6330 2.99 0.0029
GId cube -12.6568 4.4106 -2.87 0.0042
lGId 3.8870 0.8643 4.50 0.0000
lGId square -1.5528 0.8942 -1.74 0.0828
lGId cube 0.6804 1.0177 0.67 0.5039
R2train 0.0608
R2test 0.0521
Table A.30: WLS regression of 200%-trimmed changes in log wealth on cubic orthogonal
polynomials of income variables - prior gross income (GI), change in income (GId), change
in log income (lGId).
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